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INTRODUCTION
In a landmark 1984 article, Professor John Langbein described
the "nonprobate revolution" in transmission of American wealth.' He
showed that Americans had turned en masse to donative devices that
t Edward T. Foote II Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. A.B.,
Princeton University, 1977; M.A., J.D., Yale University, 1981; J.S.D., Stanford University,
1987. I thank Susan Appleton, Sam Bagenstos, Tom Gallanis, Adam Hirsch, Lynn LoPucki,
Daniel Mandelker, Laura Rosenbury, Peter Wiedenbeck, and participants in a faculty work-
shop at Washington University School of Law for comments on earlier drafts of this Article,
and Yasminat Assis, Demetrios Datch, and Jeanne Mishkin for assistance with research.
I John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1108, 1108 (1984).
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accomplished all the purposes of a will without the costs, strictures,
and inconvenience of probate.2 Professor Langbein argued that it was
time to recognize these devices for what they were-"will substitutes. 3
He called for a future "unified American law of succession" to cover
both wills and will substitutes.
4
Today, this unification process is well underway. 5 Wills doctrines
and rules, such as lapse, 6 ademption,7 mental capacity standards, 8 un-
worthy heirs exclusions, 9 and revocation upon divorce,10 increasingly
extend to even the most widely used will substitute-the revocable in-
ter vivos or living trust (revocable trust).11 Yet, one distinction re-
2 Id. at 1109-25 (discussing the use of will substitutes); see alsoJohn H. Langbein, The
Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REv. 722 passim
(1988) (discussing changing patterns in family wealth transmission).
3 Langbein, supra note 1, at 1125-34, 1140-41 (arguing that courts should abandon
the fiction that nonprobate transfers are lifetime transfers and treat those transfers as will-
like will substitutes).
4 Id. at 1141.
5 This unification has been a significant feature of recent Uniform Codes and Re-
statements. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 7.2 cmt. a (2003) ("This Restatement (along with the Restatement Third, Trusts, the
Revised Uniform Probate Code, and the Uniform Trust Code) moves toward the policy of
unifying the law of wills and will substitutes.").
6 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-606 (2005) (setting out antilapse provisions for revo-
cable trusts); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-706-707 (amended 2006) (establishing antilapse
rules for nonprobate transfers and future interests under the terms of a trust); 1 RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 cmt. p (1999) ("Anti-
lapse statutes, however, apply by analogy to revocable trusts and other will substitutes.").
7 See, e.g., Wasserman v. Cohen, 606 N.E.2d 901, 904 (Mass. 1993) (applying "the
doctrine of ademption, as traditionally applied to wills" to a revocable inter vivos trust).
8 See, e.g., Upman v. Clarke, 753 A.2d 4, 6 (Md. 2000) (holding that undue influence
rules applicable to wills apply to a revocable trust); In re Estate of Tisdale, 655 N.Y.S.2d 809,
811 (Surr. Ct. 1997) (holding that beneficiaries of a revocable trust, like will beneficiaries,
have a right to a jury trial in probate proceedings to set aside the trust on grounds of
improper execution, lack of capacity, undue influence, and fraud).
9 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 250(a)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) ("A person who
feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to ... [a]ny property, inter-
est, or benefit under a will of the decedent, including any general or special power of
appointment conferred by the will on the killer and any nomination of the killer as execu-
tor, trustee, or guardian made by the will."); OR. REv. STAT. § 112.465(1) (2005) (barring
the decedent's slayer from taking from the decedent "by intestate succession, by will or by
trust").
10 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175(A) (West 1994) (providing for revocation of
trust provisions in favor of the settlor's former spouse upon divorce or annulment). In
states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), revocation upon divorce ap-
plies to the relatives of the divorced spouse as well. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (1) (i)
(amended 2006) (revoking "any disposition or appointment created by law or in a gov-
erning instrument to a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse"). But see gener-
ally Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 83 (2004) (presenting a critical analysis of revocation-on-divorce statutes and the
continuing limitations in their application to will substitutes).
11 See generally 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 & cmts. (2003) (discussing the
use of "[r]evocable inter vivos (or living) trusts" and the extension to such trusts of doc-
trines and rules governing wills); AdamJ. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the
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mains unchallenged. Wills-and any trusts contained therein-are
public record, available to beneficiaries, heirs, thieves, reporters, and
"inquiring minds" alike.12 "Will-like"13 revocable trusts, including
those that continue for decades after the settlor's death, are private.1 4
Indeed, in most states, even current beneficiaries of a revocable trust
cannot view the full trust document that defines their rights and
interests. 15
This treatment of wills and their "functional equivalent,"'16 the
revocable trust, is not only inconsistent but also dangerous. As Profes-
sors Jesse Dukeminier and Stanley Johanson have suggested, the cur-
Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L. REv. 527, 542-45 & n.62 (2000) (discussing will substi-
tutes and efforts to extend testamentary doctrines to "nominally complete, nontestamen-
tary transfers"). One state has even extended will execution requirements to revocable
trusts that "dispose of the trust property on or after the death of the settlor other than to
the settlor's estate." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.111(1), (4) (West 2005).
12 SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 390 (6th
ed. 2000) ("A will is a public record, open to disappointed heirs, newspapers, and the just
plain curious."). Books, periodicals, newspapers, and even Web sites regularly feature wills
of particular public interest. See, e.g., HERBERT E. NAss, WILLS OF THE RICH AND FAMous
(2000) (reproducing sixty-eight wills of the "rich and famous"); Where There's a Will, PEO-
PLE, June 9, 2003, at 107 (discussing "weird but wonderful legacies," including an actor's
will that left the actor's skull to a Chicago theater company to use in productions of Ham-
let); Court TV News, Famous Wills, Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.courttv.com/people/wills
(reproducing celebrities' wills).
13 Langbein, supra note 1, at 1109 (referring to "will-like modes of transfer").
14 See DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 390-91 (discussing privacy of revoca-
ble inter vivos trusts); Lucy A. MARSH, PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW: WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 125-26 (1998) (reproducing and discussingJohn Lennon's will, under which
Lennon "was able to secure the benefits of privacy" by transferring the residue of his estate
to a preexisting inter vivos trust that was "not a matter of public record").
15 Most jurisdictions allow a beneficiary at best partial access to the trust instrument.
States that have adopted the UPC approach, for instance, permit a beneficiary "[u]pon
reasonable request" to view only the trust provisions that the trustee deems relevant to that
beneficiary. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-303(b) (amended 2006) ("Upon reasonable request,
the trustee shall provide the beneficiary with a copy of the terms of the trust which describe
or affect his interest .... ); see, eg., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.715(2) (West 2002) (same).
Since the 1990s, approximately twenty jurisdictions, largely those that have adopted the
Uniform Trust Code (UTC), have recognized a current beneficiary's right to request a
copy of the entire trust instrument. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(b)(1) (amended 2005) ("A
trustee[,] . . . upon request of a beneficiary, shall promptly furnish to the beneficiary a
copy of the trust instrument .... "); see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-8-813(B)(1) (2004)
(same). Even the most liberal statutes, however, contain limitations on beneficiary access.
For example, the UTC and nearly every jurisdiction that has adopted the UTC allow the
settlor to waive in the trust instrument a trustee's duty to respond to a beneficiary's request
for a copy of the trust instrument. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 cmt. (amended 2005)
("Among the specific requirements that a settlor may waive include the duty to provide a
beneficiary upon request with a copy of the trust instrument .... ."). For extended analysis
and critique of recent reforms that limit beneficiary access to the trust instrument, see
Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 713, 739-63 (2006).
16 UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (amended 2005) ("The basic policy. . . of the
Uniform Trust Code in general is to treat the revocable trust as the functional equivalent
of a will.").
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rent scheme efectively allows the trust settlor to do what the will
testator cannot-make a "secret will."' 17 As history has taught, secrecy
can be a cloak for exploitation, corruption, and injustice.' 8 In the
changing trust environment of the twenty-first century,19 these dan-
gers are only increasing. With the mass marketing of revocable trusts
to the unsophisticated and unwary, 20 the "erosion in fiduciary respon-
sibility,"21 and the emergence of perpetual trusts, 22 "secret" trusts pre-
sent serious concerns.
Courts, legislators, and scholars have recognized and responded
to some of trust privacy's potential dangers. They have given particu-
lar attention recently to the risks to beneficiaries denied the funda-
mental information required to enforce the trust and to monitor
trustee conduct.23 In devising their responses, however, these reform-
17 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 943 ("Should the settlor be able to
make, in effect, a secret will by using a revocable trust?"); see also 1 GEORGE M. TURNER,
REVOCABLE TRUSTS § 2:7 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing how Bing Crosby's use of a revocable
trust avoided public disclosure about the disposition of his estate and stating that Crosby's
lawyer referred to this scheme as a "private will").
18 See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 25-26
(1982); Earl Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption's Ally, 60 A.B.A. J. 550, 550 (1974)
("When secrecy surrounds government and the activities of public servants, corruption has
a breeding place.").
19 For a superb overview of the changing trust environment, see Joel C. Dobris,
Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We Don't Have to Think of
England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543 (1998).
20 See id. at 563-67 (discussing the "massification" or "pedestrianization of trusts," in-
cluding the "advent of trust mills selling revocable inter vivos trusts to old folks all over the
country"). The mass marketing of trusts began in the 1960s with the publication of Nor-
man Dacey's best-seller, How to Avoid Probate!. Id. at 563 n.91; see also NORMAN F. DACEY,
How TO AVOID PROBATE! (1965). Since that time, "do-it-yourself" trust books and software
have been "heavily marketed." In re Estate of Pozarny, 677 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (Surr. Ct.
1998) ("[P]re-printed or form living trusts... are now being heavily marketed in New York
State."). For a discussion of living trust scams, see infra notes 190-202, 238-86 and accom-
panying text.
21 Dobris, supra note 19, at 548.
22 Because of the recent trend to restrict or even repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities,
perpetual trusts increasingly "exist unmolested and undenounced." Joel C. Dobris, The
Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities or the RAP Has No Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 601, 603 (2000); see alsojesse Dukeminier &James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual
Trust, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1303 (2003) (presenting a comprehensive study of perpetual trusts,
with analyses of their origins, problems, and possible solutions). For an "empirical study of
the perpetual trust phenomenon," see generally Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities
and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 361 (2005).
23 See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust
Law at the Centurys End, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1914-15 (2000) (discussing recent reforms to
expand trust beneficiaries' access to information). This emphasis on keeping beneficiaries
informed is a hallmark of the UTC. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (amended 2005) (ex-
panding the trustee's duty to inform and report to beneficiaries). As Professor David En-
glish, Reporter of the UTC, explained, "The duty to keep the beneficiaries reasonably
informed of the administration of the trust is a fundamental duty of a trustee, for only by
being informed can the beneficiaries know of and enforce their interests." David M. En-
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ers simply take trust privacy as a given. 24 They have made no effort to
explore the continued viability of the concept or to provide an analyti-
cal framework to guide reform.
This Article reconsiders the very notion of trust privacy. It does
so through a humanistic approach that essentially looks beyond ab-
stractions to consider the actual effect of laws on people. Part I sets
out the conventional rationale for treating wills as public record but
allowing will-like revocable trusts to remain private. The remainder of
the Article addresses the basic question reformers have failed to dis-
cuss: Should trusts be private? It sets out possible arguments for and
against trust privacy. Parts II and III show that although privacy con-
fers important human benefits, it also imposes significant human costs
that reformers have largely ignored. In presenting the human impact
of trust privacy, the Article hopes to inspire a more nuanced and bal-
anced approach to reform. Part IV attempts to begin that process by
considering four possible future directions for reform and their re-
sponses to the human costs of trust privacy.
I
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WILLS AND
WILL-LIKE TRUSTS
The conventional view holds that privacy in transmission of
wealth is the ideal. Publicity is the price a decedent pays for using
"court-regulated devices" such as wills or testamentary trusts as op-
posed to a "private arrangement" such as a revocable trust.2 5 Both
devices can perform the same function and even dispose of the estate
identically.26 But the decedent who chooses the revocable trust gets
to keep her private life private, a considerable selling point to athletes,
celebrities, multimillionaires, latter-day Greta Garbos, and more com-
glish, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 Mo. L. REV.
143, 199 (2002) (discussing section 813 of the UTC). For a superb analysis of UTC provi-
sions on the duty to inform beneficiaries and state variants on those provisions, see T.P.
Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1595 (2007).
24 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1013 cmt. (amended 2005) (discussing certification of
trust):
This section ... is designed to protect the privacy of a trust instrument by
discouraging requests from persons other than beneficiaries for complete
copies of the instrument in order to verify a trustee's authority .... While a
testamentary trust, because it is created under a will, is a matter of public
record, an inter vivos trust instrument is private. Such privacy is compro-
mised, however, if the trust instrument must be distributed to third
persons.
25 In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (Ct. App. 1977).
26 Langbein, supra note 1, at 1113 ("Either by declaration of trust or by transfer to a
third-party trustee, the appropriate trust terms can replicate the incidents of a will. ...
Only nomenclature distinguishes the remainder interest created by such a trust from the
mere expectancy arising under a will.").
2008]
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mon folk with uncommon lifestyles. 27 The decedent who chooses the
will, however, "take [s] the good with the bad. s28 She gets court super-
vision and protection of her beneficiaries and estate plan but also
public knowledge of her assets, beneficiaries, and disposition-both
testamentary and personal. 29 For example, just the day after Jacque-
line Kennedy Onassis's will was filed in the New York Surrogate's
Court, the media reported in detail the disposition of her real and
personal property, even the recipients of her Indian miniatures "Lov-
ers Watching Rain Clouds" and "Gardens of the Palace of the Rajh,"
her "Greek alabaster head of a woman," and her copy of John F. Ken-
nedy's Inaugural Address signed by Robert Frost.3 0
Some wills are even more revealing. For example, Doris Duke
left most of her $1.2 billion estate to charity to support causes of par-
ticular importance to her: wildlife and farmland preservation, the per-
forming arts, the prevention of cruelty to children and animals,
ecological endeavors, education, and medical research. 3 1 She also
provided for friends, employees, relatives, and her dog.32 Duke ap-
pointed her former butler and confidant an executor and trustee. 33
Duke's friend, Imelda Marcos, and Duke's adopted daughter, Chandi
Heffner, did not fare as well, however. Duke directed Marcos to repay
a $5 million loan3 4 and disowned Heffner. 35 She explained her deci-
sion to disinherit her adopted daughter as follows: "After giving the
matter prolonged and serious consideration, I am convinced that I
27 See, e.g., 31 U. MLMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. 2017.2, at 20-27 (1997) (discussing the
use of revocable trusts in California so that the public "do[es] not have access to informa-
tion about people who die who are in the entertainment business"); Joseph D. Wright,
Skyrocketing Dollars and the Tax Reform Act of 1997: Estate Planning for the Professional Athlete in
a New Millennium, 6 SPORTS L.J. 27, 34 (1999) ("The confidentiality of a [revocable] trust
also keeps the public from having access to the athlete's financial and familial arrange-
ments by keeping them out of the public record, unlike wills."); Matthew R. Dubois, Note,
Legal Planning for Gay, Lesbian, and Non-Traditional Elders, 63 ALB. L. REv. 263, 322 & n.308
(1999) (recommending the use of revocable living trusts rather than wills because they are
not public records and because wills "may subject the private lives of your gay, lesbian, or
non-traditional elder to unwanted scrutiny").
28 In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
29 Id.
30 Steve Fainaru & Colum Lynch, Onassis Gave Bulk of Estate to Children, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 2, 1994, at 1, 12.
31 See Last Will and Testament of Doris Duke arts. II, V, VIII (Apr. 5, 1993), http://
www.courttv.com/archive/legaldocs/newsmakers/wills/duke.html [hereinafter Duke
Will].
32 See id. at arts. II.G.3, V.B-C.
33 See id. at arts. X, XI. This turned out to be an unwise choice. See NAss, supra note
12, at 475-76 (describing Duke's former butler, Bernard Lafferty, as "semi-literate, profli-
gate, [and] imprudent[,]" and detailing his many abuses of "his 'stewardship' of the Duke
estate").
34 Duke Will, supra note 31, at art. IV.B.
35 Id. at art. VII.B (stating that Heffner should "not be deemed to be my child").
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should not have adopted Chandi Heffner. I have come to the realiza-
tion that her primary motive was financial gain."3 6
The public/private distinction thus does not respond to any dif-
ferences between the transferors, survivors, assets, or beneficiaries of
wills and will-like trusts. Nor does it reflect any peculiar features of
the probate process.3 7 Rather, what drives the public/private distinc-
tion is an overarching public policy against "secrecy in public af-
fairs."'38 Wills are public record because of the "public's interest in
openness and accessibility"3 9 of court proceedings and records.40 This
36 Id. at art. XXI. Duke's efforts to disinherit her adopted daughter ultimately failed,
however. "Chandi Heffner received $60 million from the James Buchanan Duke trusts in
settlement of her claim to be a child of Doris and $5 million from the Doris Duke estate."
DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 767.
37 See In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (Ct. App. 1977) ("[N]o statute
exempts probate files from the status of public records ... ."); In re Reisman, CONN. L.
TRIB.,Jan. 22, 1996, at 76 (Conn. Prob. Ct. Dec. 19, 1995) ("As with files of other courts in
Connecticut, probate court files and the documents therein are accessible to the public.");
Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 166 N.W.2d 546, 549 n.13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1963)
("Probate records are judicial records and may become public records after proceedings
are completed and entered."); In re Estates of Zimmer, 442 N.W.2d 578, 581-85 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1989) (stating that the Wisconsin open records law gives the public the right to in-
spect the public records of any court of law, including probate courts).
38 In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 824; see also KITV-4 v. Hirai, No. 24403, 2001
Haw. LEXIS 332, at *6-7 (Haw. Aug. 30, 2001) (Acoba, J., dissenting) (arguing against
sealing probate court records from media access):
Ourjurisprudence distrusts secrecy in judicial proceedings and favors a pol-
icy of maximum public access to proceedings and records ofjudicial tribu-
nals .... "Because of our natural suspicion and traditional aversion as a
people to secret proceedings, suggestions of unfairness, discrimination, un-
due leniency, favoritism, and incompetence are more easily entertained
when access by the public to judicial proceedings are unduly restricted. Se-
crecy ofjudicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and
suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality of judges."
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
39 In re Reisman, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 22, 1996, at 78.
40 For extended discussions of the historical tradition and "structural value of public
access" to judicial proceedings, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598
(1980) (Brennan, J., concurring), see, for example, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-77 (majority
opinion); id. at 587-98 (Brennan, J., concurring); Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435
U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) ("It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general
right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents."); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The
existence of a common law right of access to judicial proceedings and to inspect judicial
records is beyond dispute."); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d
337, 351-57, 365-67 (Cal. 1999). For a sampling of the literature on public access to court
proceedings and records, see Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public
Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643 (1991); DanielJ. Solove,
Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 MiNN. L. REV. 1137
(2002); Lynn M. LoPucki, Court System Transparency (Aug. 23, 2007) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with author).
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abstract public interest is deemed so compelling that it supersedes the
privacy rights of individual decedents and beneficiaries. 41
Courts have even held that the public interest in open probate
records outweighs beneficiaries' well-founded fears of criminal42 or
terrorist43 attacks if their names and addresses are available for public
inspection. For example, after the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst in
1976, the trustees of William Randolph Hearst's testamentary trust pe-
titioned to seal the Estate of Hearst probate files on grounds that "use
of the material in the probate files would expose many hitherto unno-
ticed persons as members of the family and reveal the locations of
their homes and properties . . . . "44 The court denied the petition,
emphasizing the public's "legitimate interest in and right of general
access to court records,"45 and remanded the case to give the trustees
an opportunity to "demonstrate ... the existence of compelling rea-
sons to seal portions of the file" temporarily.46
Individual judges and clerks may deny access to wills on a case-by-
case basis. 47 But the probate court must exercise its discretion to limit
access consistent with the law's overall approach to open judicial
41 In reEstate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25 & n.3 (stating that "traditional Anglo-
American jurisprudence distrusts secrecy in judicial proceedings and favors a policy of
maximum public access to proceedings and records ofjudicial tribunals" and "point[ing]
out that Trustees' arguments as to their absolute right of privacy in these files has no
weight"); In re Reisman, CONN. L. TRIB.,Jan. 22, 1996, at 78 ("The settlor's privacy interest is
not sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in openness and accessibility of probate
court files."); Booth Newspapers, 166 N.W.2d at 546-47 (upholding a newspaper reporter's
right "to look at the last will of a prominent citizen" citing "[t]he fundamental rule in
Michigan... that citizens have the general right of free access to, and public inspection of,
public records").
42 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 383 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (rejecting the trial court's argument that the complete files of wrongful death
suits should be sealed because the decedents' families "could be victimized by thieves" if
the media have access to the files); In reEstates of Zimmer, 442 N.W.2d at 584 (rejecting the
argument that a probate court settlement agreement involving an intestate heir, Peter Zim-
mer, who killed his parents should be sealed due to "the other relatives' 'fear' of
Zimmer").
43 In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
44 Id. at 822-23.
45 Id. at 825-26.
46 Id. Three decades later, the file remains under temporary seal. Nicole LaPorte,
Trust Issues Tear at Hearst, VARIETY, Apr. 27, 2005, at 1 ("Although the [probate file] seal was
intended to be temporary, three decades later it remains . . ").
47 See, e.g., In reWill of Croker, 105 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191-92, 199 (Surr. Ct. 1951) (includ-
ing in the probate file an edited version of a will with all "scandalous, libelous and scurri-
lous" language expunged to protect the "decedent's memory"); David Josar, Radio Host's
Will Sealed ry Judge, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 25, 2000, at 6D ("A Wayne County judge has sealed
the will of Martha Jean 'The Queen' Steinberg to prevent 'souvenir hunters and other
opportunists' from pillaging her property, according to court records.").
562
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records.48 As a result, most wills are available to the public. 49 Indeed,
some wills are posted on the Internet. For instance, Katharine
Hepburn's will and codicil were filed for probate in Old Saybrook,
Connecticut on Friday, July 25, 2003.50 By Monday, the documents
were available on the Smoking Gun Web site for all the world to see.5 1
Wills of the rich and famous are not the only wills to appear on the
Internet; some probate courts now routinely post probate records on
their official Web sites. 52 In fact, an Ohio probate court has suggested
that the Americans with Disabilities Act might require courts to pub-
lish wills online to ensure "access to public records for those individu-
als whose disabilities prevent them from traveling to the court."53 The
court rejected the estate's claim that Internet display of probate
records "puts individuals 'at significant risk for theft and harm and
infringes on their constitutional right of privacy."'54
Not surprisingly, then, many see privacy as an essential feature of
the revocable trust,55 one that the legal system has gone to extraordi-
48 See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1978). The Court
stated:
It is uncontested, however, that the right to inspect and copy judicial
records is not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own
records and files, and access has been denied where court files might have
become a vehicle for improper purposes .... [T]he decision as to access is
one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be
exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case.
Id. (footnote omitted).
49 Admittedly, some wills are easier to obtain than others. For example, Bob Hope's
will was filed for probate in late August 2003 with the Los Angeles Superior Court. It was
not "released from the court's 'safekeeping' vault" until October 2003, however, after the
Smoking Gun Web site successfully "appealed to an administrative judge." See The Smok-
ing Gun, Discussion of Last Will and Testament of Bob Hope, http://
www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/bobhopewilll.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
50 Claudia Van Nes, Hepburn's Beneficiaries, HARTFORD COURANT, July 29, 2003, at Al.
51 Hepburn Will Posted on Web, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at E3.
52 See, e.g., In re Estate of Engelhardt, 804 N.E.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 2004)
(discussing the Hamilton County Probate Court's practice of making its records available
on the Internet).
53 Id. at 1058.
54 Id. at 1053 (citing Estate's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Delete Pleadings
from the Internet). The executor was particularly concerned about Internet access to
"records of the administration of the estate," which "'contain[ed] sensitive financial infor-
mation."' Id.
55 Estate of Merrill, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1998, at 29 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1998) ("[T]he privacy
thought to be afforded by lifetime trusts, as opposed to wills, is recognized as one of the
primary motivating factors in the use of lifetime trusts ...." (citation omitted)). Indeed, in
mass marketing revocable trusts to the American public, proponents cite privacy as one of
its principal advantages. See, e.g., NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AvoxD PROBATE! 45 (5th ed.
1990) ("The inter vivos trust ... is a boon to those who seek privacy. Unlike a will, its terms
are not disclosed to a probate court, and its assets and the identity of the persons to receive
them are closely guarded secrets. If you resent the piece in the newspaper telling your
business, this is the way to avoid it.").
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nary efforts to preserve. Only a few exceptions exist. Some states re-
quire the recording or registration of the trust instrument, especially
if real estate is involved.56 A court may make a trust instrument public
if the trust becomes the subject of litigation. 57 Of course, trustees
must have access to the trust instrument and tax authorities must have
access too.58 Third parties that deal with the trust or trustee-includ-
ing financial institutions, transfer agents, title insurance companies,
and purchasers of trust property-may require a copy of the trust in-
strument as a condition of doing business. 59 However, these excep-
tions leave a broad area of privacy.
Even the classic "pour-over" will that leaves part or all of the testa-
tor's estate to a preexisting trust does not usually cause the trust to
56 Ralph M. Engel, The Pros and Cons of Living Trusts as Compared to Wills, EST. PLAN.,
Apr. 2002, at 155, 163-64 (noting that states may require recording of a trust instrument
"[i] f real estate is involved .... thereby decreasing the level of privacy that a living trust can
provide"); see also GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 64 & n.21 (6th ed. 1987) (discussing and
citing statutes requiring recording); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 16 reporter's note
(2003) (discussing recording of trusts). In addition, several states, especially those that
have adopted the UPC, require registration of all testamentary and inter vivos trusts with
the relevant local court. For an example of the UPC provisions, see ALASKA STAT.
§§ 13.36.005-.025 (2004) (stating the duty to register trusts, registration procedures, and
the effects of registering or failing to register).
57 For example, in a 1995 case, a beneficiary and conservator of person petitioned a
Connecticut probate court for an accounting of his incompetent uncle's revocable inter
vivos trust. In re Reisman, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 22, 1996, at 76. Rejecting the trustees' argu-
ment that disclosure of the trust instrument would violate the settlor's "privacy interest,"
the court ordered the trustees to provide a copy of the trust instrument to the court and
"further ordered that the Trust accounting and Trust instrument shall not be confidential
but shall be placed in the court file and accessible to the public." Id. at pts. IV, V. Thus,
commentators have emphasized that the privacy of a revocable trust "can be illusory."
Bruce G. Cohne & Martha S. Stonebrook, The Living Trust in Utah-Boon or Boondoggle,
UTAH B.J., June/July 1993, at 10, 11 (citing as one "instance" the fact that "if there is any
litigation concerning the trust, a court will take jurisdiction of the trust and it will become
part of the public court record"); see also Ann Bradford Stevens, Uniform Probate Code Proce-
dures: Time for Wyoming to Reconsider, 2 Wvo. L. REv. 293, 302 (2002) ("An unhappy party
can bring suit against the trustee and thus make the trust and actions of the trustee part of
the public record.").
58 A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 189 (4th ed. 1979) ("[A] document such as the
instrument creating a revocable inter vivos trust will be filed with the [final federal estate
tax] return; but the return and its accompanying papers are not open to general public
scrutiny .... (footnote omitted)). In some states, disclosure of the trust for tax purposes
may ultimately result in "the existence of the trust . . . becom[ing] a matter of public
record." Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV.
225, 266 n.209 (1981) (discussing Missouri law).
59 JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 555 (3d ed. 2007)
(stating that "the trustee may have to provide copies of the trust document to financial
institutions that invest trust assets"); KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH
PRESERVATION: STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS 7.03[3], at 7-8 (1998) ("As a practical matter,
persons dealing with the trustee (e.g., banks, brokerage houses, and purchasers of trust
property) may require copies of the trust instrument."). This situation may not last much
longer, however. See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.B.2 (discussing reforms to limit third
parties' access to trust instruments).
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become public record.60 As one court explained, including the trust
instrument in the estate probate files would "defeat" a basic purpose
of an inter vivos trust: "to avoid publicity concerning family and busi-
ness plans."6 1 Marlon Brando's will illustrates the practical advantages
of pour-over wills for publicity-shy testators. On July 9, 2004, Brando's
will was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court.62 The public record re-
vealed that the actor left ten surviving children 63 and, notwithstanding
rumors to the contrary, 64 an estate of over $21.6 million. 65 Despite a
media feeding frenzy, reporters could not discover how Brando di-
vided his property.6 6 Except for "certain monthly payments"'6 7 to two
friends, 6 8 Brando's will devised his entire estate to his Living Trust.69
60 See Richard Gould, The Living Trust: Fact v. Fiction, 15 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 133,
136-37 (2000) (discussing the use of the pour-over scheme to "protect[ I the privacy of a
person's dispositive plan"); Dennis M. Patrick, Living Trusts: Snake Oil or Better Than Sliced
Bread?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1098 (2000) (discussing the use of a pour-over will
to promote privacy and stating that the "usual result" is that "most of the estate will remain
out of the public view").
61 In re Estate of Meskimen, 235 N.E.2d 619, 622 (I1. 1968).
62 Will Announced: Court Lists Worth of Brando Estate at $21.6M, NEWSDAY, July 10, 2004,
at A14 [hereinafter WillAnnounced]; see also Will of Marion Brando (Aug. 28, 2002) [here-
inafter Brando Will] (on file with author); First Codicil to Last Will Dated August 28, 2002
of Marion Brando (June 18, 2004) (on file with author).
63 The children ranged in age from eight to forty-four at the time the will was exe-
cuted. Brando Will, supra note 62, at art. 1. The will included "the names of two previously
unknown children" in Tahiti. Reportedly "Broke" Brando Leaves 21.6-Million-Dollar Estate,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE-ENGLISH, July 10, 2004 [hereinafter Reportedly "Broke" Brando]. Ap-
parently, Brando may have other children as well. See Drew MacKenzie, "I'm Secret Love
Child of Brando," MIRROR, July 10, 2004, at 11 (reporting that Lisa Worme "has come for-
ward to claim she is the secret love child of Hollywood great Marion Brando").
64 Will Announced, supra note 62 ("The $21.6 million in assets listed in the petition
painted a different picture of Brando's wealth than recent reports which claimed he was
facing deep debts and living off a meager Screen Actors Guild pension.").
65 Petition for Probate of Estate of Marlon Brando § 3.a(9) (No. BP086759) (filed
July 9, 2004) (on file with author). "Brando held $18.6 million in properties, which in-
clude his home on Mulholland Drive in Beverly Hills and Tetiaroa, a string of 11 tiny
islands in Tahiti[, which] he bought ... for just $267,000 in 1966 . . . ." Terry Schermer-
horn, Brando Dough a No-Go, N.Y. POST, July 10, 2004, at 8. The other $3 million is "said to
include paintings, sketches and rare scripts." See Reportedly "Broke" Brando, supra note 63.
66 The one fact the media could report was that Brando's adopted daughter, Petra,
and orphan grandson, Tuki, are not beneficiaries. Brando's will intentionally omits Petra
and Tuki's deceased mother and their issue from taking under his will and living trust.
Brando Will, supra note 62, at art. 1; see Ian Markham-Smith, Brando Cash Snub to Family,
SUNDAY EXPRESS,JUIy 11, 2004, at 18 (describing Brando's will "disinherit[ing] both the son
of his tragic daughter Cheyenne and his own adopted daughter").
67 Brando Will, supra note 62, at art. 3.1.
68 The friends are Alice Marchak and Blanche Hall. Id.
69 Id. at art. 3.2; see also Reportedly "Broke" Brando, supra note 63 ("Brando ordered his
assets.., to be transferred to a 'living trust[,]'... which under California law can remain
secret.").
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Thus, the pour-over will gave Brando after death what he most craved
during life-privacy. 70
Trust law has placed such a premium on privacy that it has de-
nied trust beneficiaries as well as the general public access to the trust
instrument. To preserve trust privacy, traditional doctrines and rules
have allowed a trust beneficiary to see at best the terms of the trust
that the trustee deems relevant to that specific beneficiary.71
Even the most reform-minded courts, legislators, and scholars
have not challenged this view of trust privacy. Nor have they made
any attempt to reconcile or explain why two supposed "functional
equivalents"-the will and the revocable trust-are treated differently
in an otherwise far-reaching scheme to unify laws governing wills and
will substitutes. Reformers simply have assumed trust privacy as the
rule and designed their proposals to intrude minimally on that pri-
vacy.72 As I have shown elsewhere, this uncritical acceptance of trust
privacy ultimately impeded and distorted reform. 73
Reformers have cited trust privacy as their principal rationale for
restricting access to a decedent's revocable trust instrument by benefi-
ciaries,7 4 the public at large,75 and third parties dealing with the trust
and trustee. 76 Yet, reformers have never defined the term "trust pri-
vacy" or explored its continuing viability.77 To compound the prob-
lem, they have used "privacy" indiscriminately to refer to diverse
interests in and parties to a trust.78
70 Will Announced, supra note 62 (describing Brando's private funeral as "cloaked in
the kind of secrecy that the two-time Oscar winner craved toward the end of his life .
[and] in keeping with his intensely private nature").
71 See supra note 15.
72 See, e.g., Administration of Trusts: Hearing on A.B. 460 Before the Assemb. Comm.
on Judiciary, 2000 Leg. 6 (Cal. 2000), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/99-OO/bill/
asm/ab_0451-0500/ab_460cfa 20000112_101603 asm comm.hunl [hereinafter Adminis-
tration of Trusts] (seeking to avoid excessive intrusion into settlors' privacy rights).
73 See Foster, supra note 15.
74 See, e.g., Administration of Trusts, supra note 72, at 6 ("[Tlhe changes... appear to
strike an appropriate balance, giving trustees needed protections while protecting the pri-
vacy rights of settlors and the rights of beneficiaries and heirs to have access to information
that affects their interests.").
75 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.B.1; see also Patrick, supra note 60, at 1099 (lament-
ing that recording statutes requiring the registration of trust instruments "destroy the pri-
vacy otherwise afforded [to a] settlor of [a] living trust").
76 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.B.2.
77 These problems are by no means limited to the trust context. "[T]he word 'pri-
vacy' has proven to be a powerful rhetorical battle cry in a plethora of unrelated contexts,"
J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.7[E] (1999), yet notori-
ously difficult to define. See DanielJ. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087,
1088-89 & nn.1-9 (2002) (citing numerous comments by "philosophers, legal theorists
and jurists . . . lament[ing] the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of pri-
vacy"); id. at 1093-124 (presenting a critical analysis of existing conceptions of privacy).
78 See, e.g., Administration of Trusts, supra note 72 (discussing California amendments
to protect the privacy rights" of living settlors of irrevocable trusts); UNIF. TRUST CODE
566
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The remainder of this Article explores the question reformers
have left unanswered: Should trusts be private? To provide a more
analytical discussion of the arguments for and against trust privacy,
Parts II and III focus on the human impact of trust privacy. This anal-
ysis shows that trust privacy creates significant human costs as well as
benefits for trust insiders and outsiders alike.
II
THE HUMAN BENEFITS OF TRUST PRIVACY
Trust privacy, like privacy in general, is not merely an abstract,
theoretical concept. 79 It can have profound financial, administrative,
and psychological implications for settlors, trustees, beneficiaries, fam-
ily survivors, and other third parties.80
A. Settlors
Trust privacy can promote settlors' control over their identity,
reputation, and property.
1. Control over Identity and Reputation
Privacy, Professor Laurence Tribe has written, allows an individ-
ual to be the "master of the identity one creates in the world... [, to]
shape the 'self' that one presents to the world, and on the basis of
which the world in turn shapes one's existence." 8' For many people,
this desire to control their own identities and reputations extends be-
§ 1013 cmt. (amended 2005) (stating that section 1013 "is designed to protect the privacy
of a trust instrument"); Martin D. Begleiter, In the Code We Trust-Some Trust Law for Iowa at
Last, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 165, 283 (2001) (stating that Iowa certification of trust reforms were
designed "to facilitate commercial transactions, while at the same time protecting the pri-
vacy of beneficiaries' interests in the trust" (footnote omitted)).
79 See Solove, supra note 77, at 1128 (proposing "[a] pragmatic approach to the task of
conceptualizing privacy" and arguing that approach "should not.., begin by seeking to
illuminate an abstract conception of privacy, but should focus instead on understanding
privacy in specific contextual situations"); see alsoJEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 210-18 (2000) (discussing political, social, economic,
and personal costs of the erosion of privacy).
80 Trust privacy can have larger implications as well. For example, South Dakota en-
acted special trust privacy legislation as part of an effort to "enhance South Dakota's appeal
for the placement of wealth." MichaelJ. Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, Essay: South Dakota Trust
Amendments and Economic Development: The Tort of "Negligent Trust Situs" at its Incipient Stage?,
44 S.D. L. REV. 662, 665 (1999). South Dakota's trust legislation, entitled "Petition to Pro-
tect Privacy," permits a trustee, settlor (if living), or beneficiary to file a petition with the
court to protect privacy "in any court proceeding concerning the trust." S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-22-28 (2004). Once the petition is filed, the trust instrument, inventory, trustee
statements and reports, and any petitions or court orders regarding the trust are sealed
and "may not be made a part of the public record." Id.
81 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304, 1389-90 (2d ed. 1988).
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yond death.8 2 They want to be remembered as they purported to be
and not as they actually were.
When a person devises property in a will, the carefully con-
structed facade of a lifetime may crumble.83 Because a will is public
record, the decedent's real relationships and personality may be re-
vealed for the entire world to see. The model family man may be
exposed as a sham when his will spews hatred towards his nearest but,
it turns out, not dearest8 4 or leaves money to a nonmarital child or
lover.8 5 For example, the holographic will of CBS reporter Charles
Kuralt revealed a shocking secret.86 Unbeknownst to his wife and the
viewing public, Kuralt had carried on a nearly thirty-year "intimate"
relationship with a Montana woman. 87 Similarly, a will may reveal the
community pillar's hidden prejudice, paranoia, or bizarre religious or
political views.88 The hero in life may be reduced to a figure of ridi-
cule after death when inquiring minds learn that his will left millions
82 AdamJ. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33, 55
(1999) ("Social psychologists have observed that the desire somehow to transcend mortal-
ity and sustain one's identity beyond the grave is both common and strong." (footnote
omitted)).
83 Of course, the opposite may be true as well. Testators may take advantage of the
publicity of probate to "communicat[e] to survivors how [they] prefer to be remembered."
Id. at 54 (footnote omitted). Through will bequests, "a testator might hope to win posthu-
mous recognition as a devoted parent, a benevolent employer, a loyal friend ... [or]
define her character with precision. Thus can she present herself to the world as a human-
itarian or, more particularly, as a hospitable host, a man of letters, a Marxist, a midget, a
tobacco aficionado-or as a fancier of equestrian blood sport." Id. at 54-55 (footnotes
omitted).
84 For a sampling of nasty will provisions about "close" family members, see Larry Van
Dyne, And to My Ungrateful Son .... WASHINGTONIAN, Nov. 1998, at 62. One will read: "My
wife ... has been most ungrateful, disrespectful, contemptible, and uncooperative and will
not deserve what she gets from me when I have left this earth .... I give her full credit for
the physical and mental suffering I have had to endure for so many years." Id.
85 See, e.g., Jo Ann Lewis, Armand Hammer's Afterlife; His Money Brought Him Praise on
Earth. In Death, It's Also Brought Acrimony, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1996, at BI (reporting that
in a "last-minute scramble" to prevent exposure of his deepest secrets after his death, Ar-
mand Hammer revised his will a dozen times during his final months and eliminated provi-
sions for his two mistresses and his nonmarital daughter). Because of the publicity of
probate, some testators attempt to "cut out a nonmarital child without mentioning the
child by name or suggesting his existence." DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 547.
Even so, the secret may become public if the child contests the will. See Presley v. Hanks,
782 S.W.2d 482, 489-90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that Elvis Presley's will leaving
property to his "lawful" children excluded his nonmarital daughter); DUKEMINIER &JOHAN-
SON, supra note 12, at 547 (providing examples).
86 In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931, 931-34 (Mont. 2000) (upholding Kuralt's ho-
lographic will leaving his Montana property to Patricia Shannon and summarizing the de-
tails of Kuralt and Shannon's relationship).
87 Id. at 932.
88 See E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 275,
282 & nn.26-27 (1999) (citing examples of bequests to "a non-mainstream religion [and] a
radical political organization"); Rachel Tobin Ramos, Will & Grace: A Church's Legal Battle
over an $18M Estate, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Aug. 11, 2003, at 1 (discussing a will
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to a parrot89 or ordered his remains frozen, turned into diamonds or
frisbees, shot into space, or interred in a Ben & Jerry's Cherry Garcia
ice cream container.90
Consider, for example, Ted Williams's tragic fate. A war hero
and Hall of Fame slugger for the Boston Red Sox during life, Ted
Williams was reduced after death to a frozen, severed, shaved, and
cracked head in an Arizona cryonics lab.9' Although Williams's will
directed that his remains be cremated and sprinkled at sea,92 these
instructions were "overridden by a greasy scrap of paper produced by
John Henry Williams 10 days after his father's death. The crude,
handwritten note, purportedly stored in the trunk of a car, describes a
vague commitment to 'bio-stasis,' and carries the signature of the
Splendid Splinter and two of his children."93
For many people, posthumous "exposure to publicity of their
own personality is distasteful, if not abhorrent."94 Indeed, the mere
prospect of such exposure can cause tremendous anxiety and distress
to the point that it denies the dying a peaceful passing. 95 Trust pri-
that left the testator's fortune to the Self-Realization Fellowship Church, "a very private
religion that some call a cult").
89 See Claudia Joseph, The Pet Rich List 2003, MAIL ON SUNDAY, May 11, 2003, at 60
(summarizing bequests to a parrot, dogs, cats, cattle, sheep, tortoises, and a chimpanzee);
Siobhan Morrissey, Wills Go to the Dogs, A.B.A. J. 24 (2003) (discussing devises to pets, in-
cluding singer Dusty Springfield's will that "took care to ensure her cat, Nicholas, would
live in the style to which he had become accustomed: his bed lined with Dusty's nightgown,
Dusty's recordings playing at bedtime, and a diet of imported baby food"). See generally
Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Humans Die?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
617 (2000).
90 See MARTIN M. SHENKMAN, INHERIT MORE 24 (2003) (discussing a case where a dece-
dent specified that she wanted her ashes interred in a Ben & Jerry's Cherry Garcia ice
cream container); Kristin Dizon, Have It Your Way, Even After You Die, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Nov. 14, 2002, at Al (discussing unusual dispositions of remains, including Frisbee
inventor Ed Headrick's instructions that his ashes be molded into frisbees, human and pet
remains turned into red, blue and yellow diamonds, and Timothy Leary's and Gene Rod-
denberry's ashes launched into space).
91 See Tom Verducci, What Really Happened to Ted Williams, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug.
18, 2003, at 66.
92 Last Will and Testament of Theodore S. Williams, at art. 1.1 (Dec. 20, 1996) (on
file with author) (directing that Williams's "remains be cremated and [his] ashes sprinkled
at sea off the coast of Florida where the water is very deep"),
93 Tim Sullivan, Williams Deserves a Hero's Farewell, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 22,
2003. The note read: "JHW, Claudia, and Dad all agree to be put into Bio-Stasis after we
die. This is what we want, To be able to be Together in The Future, even if it is [only a]
chance." Williams Note (Nov. 2, 2000) (on file with author).
94 Rudd v. Searls, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928) (referring to will contests that "fre-
quently, if not invariably, result in minute examination into the habits, manners, beliefs,
conduct, idiosyncrasies, and all the essentially private and personal affairs of the testator").
95 Cf John Crewdson, Liberace's Death Raises Privacy Questions, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1987,
at 21 (discussing Liberace's attempts to cover up the fact that he was dying of AIDS be-
cause of "what the disclosure implied about his private life"); Michelle Green, Liberace: The
Gilded Showman, PEOPLE, Feb. 16, 1987, at 24 (describing Liberace's efforts to preserve his
"deceptive public image" until the very end).
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vacy responds to this deeply personal need to define one's own public
and private selves.96 It allows settlors to devise property as they wish
without risking the reputation of a lifetime, however unfounded.97 As
discussed below,98 protecting the deceased's memory may also pro-
vide important psychic and financial benefits to settlors' survivors.
2. Control over Property
American inheritance law is locked in a family paradigm. 99 Rules
governing intestacy, wills, contracts to devise, and will substitutes favor
the so-called "natural objects of the decedent's bounty" 0 0-the dece-
dent's closest family members. 10 1 For those whose loved ones do not
fit society's definition of "natural objects"10 2 or whose estate plan does
not meet society's notion of a "natural disposition,"' 03 trust privacy
96 See ROSEN, supra note 79, at 223 ("The ideal of privacy... insists individuals should
be allowed to define themselves, and to decide how much of themselves to reveal or to
conceal in different situations."); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1219-20 (1998) (describing individuals as "hav[ing] differing pri-
vate and public masks" and stating that "[t]he ability to maintain divergent public and
private personae creates the elbowroom necessary to resist social and political homogene-
ity"). It should be noted, however, that "[t]his differentiation between public and private
visages need not be used for good ... ." Id. at 1218. It may also be "conducive to social
hypocrisy [and] interpersonal exploitation through deception." Ferdinand Schoeman, Pri-
vacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRiVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 6 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (summarizing views of people who
think "an indifference to privacy" is desirable). For an extended discussion of the dangers
privacy creates by allowing individuals to misrepresent themselves to others, see, for exam-
ple, RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 539-51 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy,
Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. R~v. 455 (1978); Lynn M. LoPucki, Did
Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (2003); Richard A. Posner, The Right to
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978).
97 This is not to say that use of a revocable trust will necessarily ensure privacy. For
example, if there is subsequent litigation over the trust, its terms may well become public.
See supra Part I; see also Armand Hammer: His Will and His Way, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 15, 1996
("Hammer had made arrangements to provide for [his lovers and nonmarital daughter]
through a living trust, but after [his wife] died and her estate sued him, the terms of the
trust became vulnerable to scrutiny and he began moving assets out of the trust .
98 See infra Part II.D.
99 Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REv. 199
(2001).
100 See Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 139 (Me. 1980) (defining "the surviving
spouse and those who stand in closest relationship within the bloodline as the natural
objects of the decedent's bounty").
101 See Foster, supra note 99, at 205-19 (discussing the preference for close family
members in intestacy, wills, contracts to devise, and will substitutes).
102 See id. at 210-12 & nn.56-58 (discussing and citing case law and scholarly commen-
tary on manipulation of testamentary doctrines and rules to defeat bequests to individuals
other than "natural objects of the decedent's bounty").
103 "Unnatural dispositions" may include not only bequests outside the family but also
bequests to family members "in amounts that deviate from intestate succession patterns."
Id. at 212; see also Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine:
What's Love Got ToDo with It, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 841, 877, 880 (1996) (noting that "[w]hen
the testamentary pattern of a will violates [the] . . . norm [of equal division among chil-
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may have significant benefits. A revocable trust that operates as a "se-
cret will" 10 4 can avoid the costs, strictures, and family bias of the pro-
bate system and give settlors control over their property at death as
well as during life. Not surprisingly, the revocable trust has become a
staple of estate planning practice for those most harmed by the family
paradigm-unmarried same-sex or opposite-sex cohabitants, non-
traditional elders, and other "nonconforming" property owners. 0 5
In theory, revocable trusts are as vulnerable to the family para-
digm as wills. Like wills, trusts that dispose of property "unnaturally"
carry a heightened risk of invalidation on grounds of undue influ-
ence, fraud, or settlor incapacity. 106 In practice, however, revocable
trusts have proven to be "more resistant" to mental capacity chal-
lenges. 10 7 While a variety of factors contribute to this resistance, 0 8
privacy is the principal reason. The practical effect of trust privacy is,
as Professor Mary Louise Fellows has observed, that "potential chal-
lengers are much less likely to know that [a] trust exists than that a
dren], eyebrows are lifted and questions are asked" and that "[d]isproportionate gifts to
relatives can also trigger undue influence claims" (footnote omitted)).
104 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 27, at 322 (recommending the use of revocable trusts
for "gay, lesbian, or non-traditional elders"); Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsi-
bilities of Estate Planning Attorneys in the Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATrLE
U. L. REv. 75, 93-94 (2003) (discussing the benefits of revocable trusts for nontraditional
couples). As Professor Sherman has observed, however, "it would hardly be reassuring to
the homosexual transferor to be advised that his testamentary plans will be kept intact only
so long as his relations do not find out about them." Sherman, supra note 58, at 266. For
an extended discussion of "nonconforming" or "abhorrent" testators, see Spitko, supra
note 88.
106 See Sherman, supra note 58, at 264-65 ("[A] homosexual settlor must be as con-
cerned about charges of undue influence as is the homosexual testator."); Spitko, supra
note 88, at 286 ("[W]ill substitutes are subject to the same grounds of attack as are testa-
mentary transfers." (footnote omitted)); supra note 8 (citing cases extending to revocable
trusts the mental capacity standards governing wills).
107 John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REv. 63, 67
(1978); see also DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 393 ("A revocable trust, like a
will, can be contested for lack of mental capacity and undue influence. In practice, how-
ever, it is more difficult to set aside a funded revocable trust than a will on these
grounds.").
108 See Langbein, supra note 107, at 67 (asserting that trusts are more resistant to capac-
ity challenges because they "belong to the jury-free realm of equity law"); Jane A. Mar-
quardt, A Will-Not a Wish-Makes It So: Estate Planning Options for Same-Sex Couples, FAM.
ADvoc., Summer 1997, at 35, 38 ("Revocable trusts are also harder to challenge. Because
no court proceeding is pending, a family member who wants to contest the estate plan
must take the initiative to hire a lawyer and file an action contesting the trust."); Sherman,
supra note 58, at 266 n.209 (noting that unlike a will, "[a] funded revocable inter vivos
trust . . . because it generally provides for payments to the settlor throughout his life,
continually thrusts itself into the setdor's consciousness... [and thus,] a contestant might
have more difficulty persuading a jury that a revocable inter vivos trust was the product of
the ephemeral influence of a beneficiary").
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will exists."10 9 In fact, in marked contrast to the wills context, even
those most privileged by the family paradigm-the settlor's heirs-
receive no notice of a trust that adversely affects their interests.110
Thus, trust privacy ultimately trumps the family paradigm.
Privacy does more than prevent "disruption"'111 of settlors' dispos-
itive schemes, however. It further promotes settlors' control over
property by protecting the assets settlors can leave to their survivors.
By discouraging potential challenges to trusts,112 privacy in turn pre-
vents depletion of settlors' estates.1 13 Money that would otherwise be
109 Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1066, 1094
(1980).
110 Cf. WILLIAM M. MCGOVER-N, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
342 (3d ed. 2004) ("[M]any states require that heirs be notified before a will is admitted to
probate, whereas no such notice is given to persons adversely affected by a living trust.").
California, however, does require notice to the settlor's heirs upon "the death of a settlor
or irrevocability within one year of the death of the settlor of the trust by the express terms
of the trust because of a contingency related to the death of a settlor." CAL. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 16061.7(b) (2) (West Supp. 2007). Even where notice is not required, it may be
desirable for statute of limitations purposes. For example, under UTC section 604, "[a]
person may commence a judicial proceeding to contest the validity of a trust that was
revocable at the settlor's death within... [three] years after the settlor's death .... " UNiF.
TRUST CODE § 604(a) (1) (amended 2005). If the trustee sends that person "a copy of the
trust instrument and a notice informing the person of the trust's existence, of the trustee's
name and address, and of the time allowed for commencing a proceeding," the contestant
has only 120 days to contest the trust. Id. § 604(a) (2).
111 Fellows, supra note 109, at 1095 ("Through the revocable trust, the settlor can help
to protect against disruption of his dispository scheme .... " (footnote omitted)).
112 See DACEY, supra note 55, at 45 ("In a word, the publicity of probate invites attack
upon a will; the privacy of an inter vivos trust discourages it.").
113 See Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final
Threat, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 629, 635-36 (1994) (stating that "[w]ill contests, with their attend-
ant costs and attorneys' fees, can significantly reduce the bequests beneficiaries actually
receive" and citing as examples cases in which "litigation costs consumed approximately
one-third of an estate" and where "the reported legal fees exceeded twenty-four million
dollars" (footnotes omitted)). By discouraging litigation, privacy can reduce other costs as
well. Such costs include delays in distributing assets to beneficiaries, Gerry W. Beyer et al.,
The Fine Art of Intimidating Disgruntled Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REv.
225, 263 (1998), and "emotional costs" to survivors. Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Eld-
erly: Using Mediation To Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 397, 425-28 (1997). Contests over decedents' assets can "generate family
animosity and bring family quarrels and testators' private lives to public view." Begleiter,
supra, at 636 (footnote omitted); see also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing advantages of trust
privacy for maintaining relationships among survivors). For those concerned about their
posthumous reputation, the costs of litigation may be particularly onerous. See Begleiter,
supra, at 636-39 (discussing the "examination into a testator's beliefs, habits, and idiosyn-
crasies" and providing examples of the "ridicule, contempt, and criticism associated with
the publicity surrounding a will contest" (footnote omitted)). Decedents who leave prop-
erty outside the family paradigm may be particularly at risk of such "insult[s] [to the]
memory of the deceased." Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511,
578 (1992). For an extended discussion of the use of mental capacity doctrines to overturn
"unnatural" wills, see, for example, Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38
ARiz. L. REV. 235, 243-69 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L.
REv. 571 (1997); Spitko, supra note 88, at 278-87.
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expended in defending trusts goes where settlors intended-to bene-
ficiaries rather than lawyers. 114
Even long after a settlor's death, trust privacy can continue to
preserve the settlor's dispositive scheme and assets. Trust privacy al-
lows settlors to prevent not only potential challengers but also benefi-
ciaries and creditors from knowing that the trust exists.'1 5 In so
doing, privacy can reduce future litigation and its associated costs.' 1 6
Moreover, privacy can further enhance settlors' control over property
by limiting beneficiary harassment of trustees. As the next section will
discuss, privacy can effectively give trustees free rein to manage trust
assets as directed by trust settlors, not beneficiaries.
B. Trustees
Recent reports suggest that beneficiaries have declared war on
trustees. Beneficiaries picket trustees, 117 lobby for new legislation to
114 See BOGERT, supra note 56, at 356-57. According to Bogert:
Expenses incurred by the trustee in performing his duty to defend the trust
are payable from the trust property where the defense is successful. And
even if the trustee were unsuccessful, the court may allow counsel fees out
of trust property where the result of the transaction had not been the total
destruction of the trust, and the trustee acted in good faith.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The settlor's estate could be even further depleted if the contest-
ant of the revocable trust is the settlor's executor or administrator. Estate executors and
administrators have a fiduciary duty to collect estate assets, which may include "main-
tain[ing] an action to recover possession of property or to determine the title thereto."
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-709 (amended 2006). Like trustees, executors and administrators
are generally not personally liable for expenses incurred in litigation on behalf of the
estate. Id. § 3-720 (stating that if such a fiduciary "defends or prosecutes any proceeding in
good faith, whether successful or not he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary
expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred"). Thus, the
costs of both contesting and defending the settlor's trust would be paid out of the settlor's
assets.
115 See infra Part II.B (discussing litigation and other actions by beneficiaries); see also
Engel, supra note 56, at 164 ("If the client has a beneficiary who has substantial debts, he or
she may want to keep the fact that the beneficiary will receive assets under the client's will
from the beneficiary's creditors.").
116 Even in subsequent court proceedings over a trust, the trustees may pay their legal
expenses out of trust assets. See Carolyn T. Geer, Bad Heir Days, FORBES, June 17, 1996, at
212 (reporting that after the plaintiffs of a beneficiary class action suit against Mellon Bank
lost on appeal, the bank sought $1.15 million from the named plaintiffs trust or from his
lawyers to pay its legal fees, "potentially wiping out most of the trust").
117 See Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the
Uniform Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lense Help Clarify the Rights of
Beneficiaries?, 67 Mo. L. REV. 241, 242 n.2 (2002) ("[I]n March 2001, a small group of
protesters gathered outside the Deutsche Bank building in Manhattan, New York. They
accused the bank of mismanaging trust accounts, including a $17-million estate.").
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reduce trustee powers,118 and flood trustees1 19 and the media with
complaints about trustee investment decisions, high fees, and insensi-
tivity to beneficiaries' needs.' 20 Individual and class action suits
against trustees are up and are only likely to increase as baby boomers
and their trusts age. 12 1 Beneficiaries even have their own support
group, Heirs,® Inc., complete with a fight song and Web site that
posts horror stories of trustee malfeasance and do-it-yourself guides to
picketing and suing trustees.' 22
Recent trust reforms have taken a decided tilt toward beneficiary
rights. Indeed, commentators have acknowledged that the UTC "pro-
vides a bill of rights for beneficiaries." 1 23 Over the past decade alone,
state legislatures and courts have expanded beneficiary powers to
118 See, e.g., Katharine Fraser, Trust Reform Group Clamors for Freedom To Switch Banks,
Am. BANKER, Dec. 22, 1995, at 1 (stating that the beneficiary advocacy group "Heirs, Inc. is
waging a lobbying battle for portability in ... Pennsylvania"). See generally Standish H.
Smith, Reforming the Corporate Administration of Personal Trusts-The Problem and a Plan, 14
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 563 (2000) (containing proposals from Heirs, Inc. co-founder advo-
cating extensive legislative reforms, including additions and revisions to an early version of
the Uniform Trust Code).
119 Communication with trustees, especially corporate trustees, has been problematic,
however. Simon Barker-Benfield, The Trouble with Trusts: What Are Beneficiaries To Do When
Funds Are Mismanaged?, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb. 1, 1998, at GI (discussing beneficiary com-
plaints about nonresponsiveness of trustees); Jo Ann Engelhardt & Robert W. Whitman,
Administration with Attitude: When to Talk, When to Walk, PROB. & PROP., May/June 2002, at
12, 13-14 (discussing complaints regarding lack of communication).
120 See, e.g., Alison Beard, When Trust in the Trustees Runs Out, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002,
at 26 (discussing the "high-profile dispute [over Harry Winston's trust as] highlight[ing] a
fundamental, and escalating, tension between beneficiaries and the various institutions
that manage trusts"); Mike McNamee, Keeping Trusts Out of Harm's Way, Bus. WK., Apr. 10,
2000, at 228 (discussing beneficiaries' complaints about trustees).
121 See Barker-Benfield, supra note 119 (discussing beneficiary complaints about "unsat-
isfactory trust management" and claims that "the problem will only mushroom as aging
baby boomers start inheriting from their parents and making their own long-term money
management plans"); Margaret Price, Inherited Problems, NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 2002, at F8 (re-
ferring to the "'dramatic' rise in trusts and estates litigation" (quoting a Chicago trusts and
estates lawyer)); Mark Skertic, Bank Trust Conversions Trigger Suits, CHlI. TRni., June 15, 2003,
at C1 (discussing class action suits against Bank One, Bank of America, First Union Corp.,
and LaSalle Bank). As Professor Robert Whitman and Kumar Paturi have emphasized,
however, current court procedures and litigation costs mean that "beneficiaries who can-
not gain the services of an attorney to carry out the necessary procedural steps required to
bring a trustee before the court" cannot "effectively assert in court the rights that the law
has, in theory, granted to a trust beneficiary." Robert Whitman & Kumar Paturi, Improving
Mechanisms for Resolving Complaints of Powerless Trust Beneficiaries, 16 QUINNIPIAC PROB. LJ.
64, 70 (2002).
122 Heirs,& Inc. [hereinafter Heirs], founded in 1991, describes itself as "the first
group of 'unhappy' beneficiaries in the country dedicated to reforming the administration
of trusts/estates." Heirs, http://www.heirs.net (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). It has a "2,400-
strong mailing list." Beard, supra note 120. It produces a newsletter, Fiduciary Fun, pub-
lishes books on trust management issues, holds conferences, and has a Web site which
contains, inter alia, a list of banks and numbers of beneficiary complaints against those
banks on file with Heirs. See Heirs, supra.
123 Joseph Kartiganer & Raymond H. Young, The UTC: Help for Beneficiaries and Their
Attorneys, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 18, 21.
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modify and terminate trusts, demand information from trustees, veto
changes in trust situs, and remove trustees. 124 And, if some reformers
have their way, beneficiaries will soon be able to fire and hire trustees
at will.1
2 5
In an era of beneficiary empowerment, trust privacy can provide a
buffer between beneficiary and trustee. Beneficiaries with little or no
knowledge of their rights and interests under a trust are less likely to
assert those rights, second-guess trustee decisions, or insist on an ac-
tive role in trust management. Trust privacy thus can offer trustees
significant benefits. By promoting secrecy and thereby reducing op-
portunities for beneficiaries to interfere with trusts, privacy promises
to reduce the administrative costs and hassles that increasingly plague
today's trustees.
C. Beneficiaries
Trust privacy can also protect beneficiaries from the outside
world, each other, and themselves.
1. Protection from the Outside World
Critics of the probate process paint a grim picture of heirs and
will beneficiaries victimized by con men, thieves, and fortune
hunters.1 26 The source of the problem, they claim, is probate's pub-
licity. 12 7 "Unscrupulous characters" 128 use public probate files to
identify future targets.1 29 Apparently, there is even a booming busi-
124 For summaries and analyses of these reforms, see, for example, Ronald Chester,
Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Centuiy: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet
Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 697 (2001); Chester & Ziomek, supra note 117, at
248-59; Halbach, supra note 23; Kartiganer & Young, supra note 123, at 19-20.
125 See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 117, at 249 (discussing proposals that would allow
beneficiaries "to switch easily from one corporate trustee to another without having to
show breach of trust or some other substantial cause, [so that] banks would be forced to
compete, driving down administrative costs and fees, while, at the same time, allowing
beneficiaries to seek more productive investing and more cost-effective trust administra-
tion" (footnote omitted)); Lewis Beale, An Heir-RaisingEnterprise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992,
at El ("'What we are saying ... is that the beneficiary must have the right to shop, to
switch, to watch over his own welfare, because there isn't anyone else to do that.'" (quoting
Standish Smith's explanation for Heirs' proposal to give beneficiaries enhanced powers to
remove trustees) ).
126 See, e.g., DAcEY, supra note 55, at 28 (describing widows and heirs who "become the
victim of... sharpsters," "con m [e] n," and "unscrupulous characters"); HENKEL, supra note
59, 1 7.02[1] [b], 7-4 (providing examples of married couples who want to avoid listing
their estate assets in the public probate records "so that fortune hunters and other scoun-
drels will not be as likely to start pestering the survivor . . . [and to avoid] attract[ing]
thieves and other unscrupulous characters").
127 DACEY, supra note 55, at 28.
128 Id.; HENKEL, supra note 59, 1 7.02[1] [b], 7-4.
129 DACEY, supra note 55, at 28 (stating that a decedent's survivor can "become the
target of the unscrupulous characters who purchase [probate] lists"); MARY RANDOLPH, 8
WAYS TO AvoID PROBATE 5 (6th ed. 2006) (stating that con artists use probate records to
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ness in compiling and selling probate lists of "hot prospects" 130 ripe
for the plucking-recent widows, heirs, and beneficiaries.' 3 ' As a re-
sult, the mere appearance of a name in the probate records can be a
"prelude to financial disaster."13 2 The publicity of probate can also
endanger survivors' lives, identities, and reputations. Probate files are
open to all, including kidnappers, 133 identity thieves,134 and tabloid
reporters. 135
Trust privacy responds to this need to protect beneficiaries from
the outside world. It allows settlors to transfer wealth without publicly
disclosing their assets, their survivors' names and addresses, and their
nastiest parting shots-justified or otherwise-about a survivor's infi-
delity, parentage, vices, or character flaws. 136
2. Protection from Each Other
Trust privacy can also protect beneficiaries from each other. Set-
tlors, trustees, or even beneficiaries may not want certain beneficiaries
to know the names and shares of other beneficiaries for a variety of
collect information about survivors who "might be vulnerable to scams"); see also In re Es-
tate of R.R., Jr., 582 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (Surr. Ct. 1992) (citing as one rationale for sealing
probate court files in a wrongful death settlement that "confidentiality protects settling
plaintiffs from becoming targets of unwanted solicitations and swindles").
130 DACEY, supra note 55, at 28.
131 Id. According to Dacey:
[P]eople . . . go from probate court to probate court, compiling lists of
names of widows and other heirs. Anyone can purchase such a list of
names and addresses of widows, compiled from probate court records and
broken down into three groups. Names of those who have been widows for
ten years or longer will cost $100 per thousand, while the names of those
who have been widows for six years or for three years will sell for $150 or
$200 per thousand, respectively. These latter are prime prospects for a con
man because presumably there is less likelihood that they have already lost
whatever was left to them ....
Id.
132 Id.
133 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Estate of Hearst case).
134 See Editorial, Make Probate Records Accessible by Internet, SAN ANTONIO ExPR, ss-NEws,
Sept. 29, 2003, at 4B (noting that probate records may "include bank account numbers
and Social Security numbers" and reporting concerns about identity thieves' access to pro-
bate records).
135 See DACEY, supra note 55, at 28 (reporting that newspapers assign reporters to pro-
bate courts); TURNER, supra note 17, at 6 (describing the "near-obscene" media coverage of
Natalie Wood's will); supra notes 12, 30 and accompanying text (discussing journalists'
access to probate records).
136 See Paul T. Whitcombe, Defamation by Will: Theories and Liabilities, 27 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 749, 751 nn.13-1 8 (1994) (citing examples of nasty wills including a will that de-
scribed the testator's wife as an "'adulteress and fiend in human form'" and a will that
accused the testator's daughters of having an "'unfilial attitude toward a doting father,'"
and left "'the sum of $1.00 to each and a father's curse."' The will went on to declare,
"'May their lives be fraught with misery, unhappiness, and poignant sorrow. May their
deaths be soon and of lingering and torturous nature. May their souls rest in hell and
suffer the torments of the condemned for eternity.'").
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reasons. In the most typical case, the goal is to preserve harmony
among settlors' survivors.13 7 As literature and human experience have
shown, unequal or inequitable dispositions to family and friends can
lead to jealousy, anger, and pitched battles-both emotional and le-
gal.' 38  Survivors often view a decedent's last wishes in a will as not
only a dispositive scheme but a statement of lifelong love and appreci-
ation-or lack thereof-for those around the decedent.'39 In an era
of serial marriages and blended families, an "unfair" will may well
cause "permanent rupture"140 of already tenuous relationships among
a decedent's survivors.141 The battle over vacuum cleaner magnate H.
Earl Hoover's estate is illustrative. When Hoover's adopted stepson,
Robert, discovered that his father had disinherited him, he was
137 As Professor Susan Gary has observed, "[p]ersons planning the transfer of property
after death . . .generally view family harmony as a tangential, but important goal." Gary,
supra note 113, at 397. Although most of the literature has emphasized what Professor
Ronald Chester has aptly called the "corrosive effect [of will contests] on families," Ronald
Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?: Jury 7ials and Mediation as a Means of Resolving Will
Contests, 37 DuQ. L. REV. 173, 174 (1999), equal concerns arise in the revocable trust con-
text. Gary, supra note 113, at 416 n.116 (noting that "family disagreements" arise over
distribution of the decedent's nonprobate as well as probate property); Lela Porter Love,
Mediation of Probate Matters: Leaving a Valuable Legacy, I PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 255, 257 n.8
(2001) (referring to "donors who value family relations, harmony and the preservation of
trust assets from the ravages of litigation").
138 For extended discussion and examples of situations where survivors' differing views
of "fair" and equitable distribution of the decedent's assets creates conflicts, see GERALD M.
CONDON & JEFFREY L. CONDON, BEYOND THE GRAVE: THE RIGHT WAY AND THE WRONG WAY
OF LEAVING MONEY TO YOUR CHILDREN (AND OTHERS) 19-35 (1995); SHENKMAN, supra note
90, at 215-30; Gary, supra note 113, at 416-24. For a sampling of cases where decedents'
"closest" family and nonfamily survivors battled over revocable trusts, see In re Estate of
Mumby, 982 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), which involved the decedent's daugh-
ter and "very close ... next door neighbors" and friends who helped him with chores,
cooked for him, mended his clothes, checked in with him regularly, kept him company,
and enabled him "to live in his own home up to the time of his death," and In re Estate of
Tosh, 920 P.2d 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), which involved the decedent's daughters and
life partner.
139 See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to the Uses of Mediation and Other Forms of
Dispute Resolution in Probate, Trust, and Guardianship Matters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
601, 636 (2000) ("Disputes in probate, trust, or guardianship matters may be the tangible
manifestation of long-standing family problems (e.g., sibling rivalry, perceived favoritism,
jealousy, or disapproval of a marriage or other relationship)." (footnote omitted)).
140 Pamela Yip, Preparing a Legacy: Careful Estate Planning Can Keep Heirs from Fighting,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 25, 2003, at ID; see also Radford, supra note 139, at 637-38
("Many, if not most, cases arising in probate, trust, and guardianship involve families whose
relationships could be irreparably shattered by bitter and prolonged litigation." (footnote
omitted)).
141 See SHENEMAN, supra note 90, at 225 ("The increasing complexity of many family
structures-blended families, nontraditional families, second, third, and later marriages,
make the prospects of a will challenge more likely."). Battles between a decedent's spouse
and his children from a prior marriage are particularly common. See, e.g., Marshall v. Mar-
shall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (involvingJ. Howard Marshall's wife, Anna Nicole Smith, and his
son from a prior marriage); DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE Epic BATTLE FOR
THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993) (discussing the will contest between Seward
Johnson's wife and his children from a prior marriage).
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"[s] tunned and angry, looking for proof that the father he loved died
loving him back."'142 Robert filed a will contest alleging that his
brother, stepmother, ex-wife, and two daughters had "destroy[ed] the
once warm and loving relationship"'143 between him and his father by
fraudulently stating that Robert had left his ex-wife and daughters des-
titute in his divorce settlement and had refused to pay for his daugh-
ters' educations. 14 4 The result was years of litigation 145 and a family so
fractured that it communicated only through lawyers. 146
Another reason to keep beneficiaries' names and interests private
may be to deter beneficiaries from pressuring other beneficiaries to
limit requests for trust funds.147 In so doing, trust privacy may en-
courage beneficiaries to seek appropriate medical treatment, educa-
tion, and support without fear of harassment by other current or
future beneficiaries. 148
In extreme situations, trust privacy may help safeguard benefi-
ciaries from physical harm at the hands of other beneficiaries. For
example, in a 1992 Michigan case, 149 the trustee of a discretionary
support trust used precisely this rationale to deny a trust remainder-
man access to a complete copy of the trust instrument. 150 The trustee
argued that because of the remainderman's alleged drug use,1 51 the
142 Mary T. Schmich, A Family Feuds over Fortune, CHI. TPUB., Nov. 9, 1986, at Cl.
143 In re Estate of Hoover, 615 N.E.2d 736, 739 (Ill. 1993).
144 Id. Robert challenged the will on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and
undue influence. "The undue influence count was based on allegations that Mr. Hoover's
free will and agency had been overcome by a calculated series of lies, misrepresentations,
and omissions concerning Robert's character" and that "these misrepresentations struck at
the core of Mr. Hoover's ethical code of conduct .... " Id.
145 See William Grady, Hoover Estate Lawsuit To Get a Trial by Jury, CHI. TRuB., June 18,
1993, at 3 (describing the "long-running legal feud" over the Hoover estate).
146 Schmich, supra note 142 (stating that Robert and his stepmother, Miriam, "no
longer speak, their anger at each other conveyed and buffered by lawyers"). What made
this situation particularly tragic was that Miriam and Robert were "[o]nce close friends-
Miriam helped [Robert] learn to drive a car and to decipher high school algebra... [and]
'was more of a mother to [him] than'" his own mother. Id.
147 See HENKEL, supra note 59, 40.02[1]-[2], 3-6 (discussing problems with trusts
that provide income to support the settlor's surviving spouse for that spouse's lifetime with
the remainder going to the settlor's children and stating that such trusts involve the "clas-
sic conflict-producer, the zero-sum situation-a dollar more income for Stepmom is a dol-
lar less principal for Stepdad's kids"); DAN RO-I-rENBERG, THE INHERITOR'S HANDBOOK
155-57 (1999) (discussing conflicts among "beneficiaries whose needs or perspectives
differ").
148 In some cases, however, the trustee rather than fellow beneficiaries may be the
problem. See, e.g., Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (involv-
ing a trustee who "discouraged [a beneficiary] from making any requests for principal").
149 In re Childress Trust, 486 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).




life beneficiary "fear[ed] for her safety if her identity and other infor-
mation were disclosed." 52
Desperate or greedy beneficiaries may even go so far as to mur-
der another beneficiary to enlarge or accelerate their trust interests.
Indeed, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and
Other Donative Transfers have explicitly recognized this possibility to
the point of extending the "slayer rule" to cover "felonious and inten-
tional killing" of trust beneficiaries.15 3 In the pet trust context at least,
there is such concern for the life expectancy of present beneficiaries
that experts advise settlors to choose remainder beneficiaries care-
fully. They "caution the pet owner against leaving the remainder to
the caretaker, lest that tempt the caretaker to shorten the pet's life in
order to keep the money."'154
Additionally, recent horrific reports of elder and family abuse1 55
suggest that the settlor's human beneficiaries may also be at risk. Un-
fortunately, there are numerous examples of elderly, disabled, and
vulnerable individuals killed or neglected to death by caregivers or
family members who stand to inherit from their victims. Eighty-six-
year-old Olive Apponey, for instance, died from an overdose of
152 Id. at 146. The trustee also argued unsuccessfully that "he was obligated to disclose
only minimal information to petitioner because she was a contingent beneficiary .. " Id.
at 143. The court ruled that the petitioner held a vested remainder interest and was enti-
led to trust information but remanded the case to determine whether the income benefi-
ciary's safety would in fact be jeopardized by release of her name and other information.
Id. at 146.
153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4
cmts. c, m (2003) (clarifying that "the slayer is not allowed to benefit from the victim's
premature death whether or not the victim was the donor" and providing as an example a
remainder beneficiary "responsible for the felonious and intentional killing of the income
beneficiary").
154 Morrissey, supra note 89, at 25; see also Beyer, supra note 89, at 671. Equally danger-
ous are pet trusts that do not name any remainder beneficiary. The settlor's "successors in
interest," often her closest surviving human family members, have a financial incentive to
euthanize the pet "for health reasons" and prevent the trust from ever going into effect.
Beyer, supra note 89, at 671. For example, a Florida woman left $25,000 to her "'beloved
friend ... for the care and shelter of [the testator's] two dogs, Riley and Shaun.'" Phillips
v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). Two days after the testa-
tor's death, her family "decided it would be best to put the 10-year-old animals to sleep."
Dog Lover's Estate Wins $25,000 Appeal FORT PIERCE NEWS, Dec. 18, 1998, at A2. According
to the testator's mother, "Marie was exceptionally close to those dogs. That's why we felt at
their age and with her gone, that was the merciful thing to do." Id. (quoting Ramona
McCall, Holzmann's mother). After the testator's parents put the dogs to sleep, they "peti-
tioned to have the $25,000 returned to the estate." Estate of Holzmann, 740 So. 2d at 2. The
court ruled in favor of the parents on grounds that "the honorary trust failed when the
dogs were put to sleep." Id.
155 For summaries and discussions of such reports, see, for example,John B. Breaux &
Orrin G. Hatch, Confronting Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation: The Need for Elder Justice
Legislation, 1] ELDER L.J. 207 (2003); Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A
Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401 (1995);Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-
Determination of the Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal for
Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1818 (1992).
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painkillers and sleeping pills administered by her caregiver, Carolyn
Kramer.1 56 Apponey died just eight days after she named Kramer and
Kramer's husband the sole beneficiaries under her will.1 57 What
made this death even more suspicious was that Kramer "had made
arrangements for a funeral and cremation for Apponey the day before
[Apponey] died." 158
In "as sordid a [case] as is to be found in the annals of Maryland
crime,"159 a father, Lawrence Horne, hired a hit man to kill his son,
Trevor, "a severely handicapped, quadriplegic eight-year-old boy
along with the boy's mother for a combined price of $6,000."160
Horne had a "strong financial motive"161 -inheritance of Trevor's en-
tire $1,839,920 estate, the funds remaining from a medical malprac-
tice settlement for the procedure that had left Trevor with "severe
brain damage and cerebral palsy. ' 162
Some victims suffer slower deaths. They are neglected-even
starved-to death by "caregivers" who happen to be their intestate
heirs or will, insurance, or trust beneficiaries.1 63 For example, when
Shirley Swanson, a seventy-eight-year-old mentally disabled woman,
died in 2002, she was "literally skin and bones."1 64 She weighed only
seventy-five pounds; "[h]er collarbones, her pelvic bones and her
spine protruded from her body."' 65 Her caregiver cousin, who stood
to inherit at Swanson's death the bulk of a family trust fund created
for Swanson's care, was eventually convicted of criminal neglect for
"knowingly depriv[ing] her of adequate food and medical care." 166
156 Charles Bosworth Jr., Bequest Is Challenged in Poisoning Death, ST. Louis POsT-DIS-
PATCH,Jan. 15, 1999, at B1.
157 Id.
158 Id. Kramer was convicted of manslaughter and "agreed... to give up her claim to
the victim's estate, part of which [would] still go to her husband." Jim Getz, Caregiver
Forgoes Cut of Patient's Estate, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2000, at B1.
159 Perry v. Maryland, 822 A.2d 434, 436 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 439.
162 Id. at 439-40.
163 For a particularly grim case, see Joseph Rose, Caregiver Daughter Convicted in Death,
THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 10, 2002, at C3, which describes a seventy-six-year-old woman's "'liv-
ing hell' with her caregiver daughter." The elderly woman was confined to a "feces-and-
urine stained bed" and died emaciated, dehydrated, and "covered with bedsores, some
exposing bone." Id. For another example, see The Dark Side of a Hollywood Ending, L.A.
TIMES, May 13, 1998, at El, which reports that a seventy-eight-year-old man died of starva-
tion five months after marrying his caregiver.
164 Kara Spak, Doctor Testifies Woman Starved; Elgin Couple's Attorneys Argue There's No
Evidence Death Was Deliberate, DAILY HERALD (Chicago), Oct. 23, 2003, at Fl.
165 Victoria A.F. Camron, Elgin Couple Not Guilty of Murder, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2003, at
1.
166 Id. (quoting CircuitJudge Timothy Sheldon). The cousin's wife was also convicted
of criminal neglect. Id. The prosecution had filed first-degree murder charges against the
couple, claiming that "[t]hey intentionally killed her by starving her to death to collect the
proceeds of the trust." Dan Rozek, Prosecutors Say Heirs Starved Woman for Money, CHI. SUN-
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Trust privacy may reduce this ultimate risk to a trust beneficiary by
denying information to those who would most profit from a benefici-
ary's untimely demise.
3. Protection from Themselves
In 1889, Andrew Carnegie wrote: "I would as soon leave to my son
a curse as the almighty dollar."'167 Carnegie's concern about the im-
pact of inheritance continues unabated today. 168 For example, bil-
lionaire Warren Buffett has announced that he plans to leave his
children only "a few hundred thousand" and the rest to charity.' 69
Buffett has concluded that "the perfect amount is enough so they feel
they could do anything, but not so much that they could do
nothing." 70
The popular media and scholarly literature alike regularly chroni-
cle the "wasted lives"1 71 of so-called "trust fund babies"-the descend-
ants of the fabulously wealthy who lack any incentive to work and
instead devote their days and nights to almost unimaginable financial
and personal excesses. 172 Hotel heiress Paris Hilton, for instance, has
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at 54 (quoting prosecutor Robert Berlin). The judge dismissed the
charges, however, on grounds that insufficient evidence existed that the couple had inten-
tionally killed Swanson. Camron, supra note 165, at 1. He sentenced the couple to 30
months of probation and 240 hours of community service. Elgin Couple Get Probation for
Neglecting Elderly Relative, THE TIMES (Munster, IN), Dec. 12, 2003, http://www.nwitimes.
com/articles/2003/12/12/news/localillinois/ee0a50aeac8cb60c86256diO007e796f.txt.
167 ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 21 (Edward
C. Kirkland ed., 1962) (1889).
168 For a sampling of the scholarly literature, see Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited
Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 99 (1990), which details the argument that "[g]reat wealth
confers tremendous disincentives to work, extraordinary incentives to consume frivolously,
and unbelievable power." See also Joel C. Dobris, Federal Transfer Taxes: The Possibility of
Repeal and the Post Repeal World, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 709, 717 (2000) (discussing "the argu-
ment that trusts make beneficiaries weak," which he calls "sissification"); AdamJ. Hirsch &
William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1992) (discussing
the argument that "bequests dampen beneficiaries' incentives to produce their own
wealth").
169 Alison Adato, So Young, So Rich: From Trust Fund Babies to Self-Made Mini Moguls, a
New Generation of Superwealthy Kids Handles Its Money in Styles Ranging from the Prudent to the
Party-Ready, PEOPLE, Jan. 27, 2003, at 52.
170 Id.
171 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 198 (referring to the "wasted lives of
people with too much money").
172 See, e.g.,John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2040 (1994) (reviewing
DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON &JOHNSON FOR-
TUNE (1993)) ("As adults, [Seward Johnson's] children were embarrassing wastrels, con-
stantly in debt to their trust funds. They fared as badly in their marriages and family lives
as in their careers and business affairs. The extravagant marital and extramarital adven-
tures of one of Seward's daughters, Mary Lea, would strain credulity in a work of cheap
fiction." (citations omitted)); Colleen Cason, Inherited Wealth Loses Its Luster, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, June 22, 2003, at BI (describing Max Factor heir and convicted rapist, An-
drew Luster, as "reinforc[ing] the stereotype of the spoiled, self-absorbed, trust-fund
baby"); see also EILEEN GALLO &JoN GALLO, SILVER SPOON KIDS (2001).
2008]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
become a byword for extravagance. Her penchant for shopping and
luxury has even inspired a hit reality television show that features
her 173 comic efforts to adapt to the "simple life" of ordinary Ameri-
cans. 174 Hilton amply deserves her reputation for extravagance. For
example, at one Los Angeles party, she "arrive[d] by helicopter ...
frocked up in a little Chanel number that just happen[ed] to match
that worn by her chihuahua, Tinkerbell-even down to the shoes.' 117 5
Although these stories of waste and arrested development are by
no means true of all beneficiaries, 176 some decedents have concluded
that it is essential to keep their legacies to survivors-especially young
survivors-secret for the survivors' own good. As Joseph Kartiganer
and Raymond Young have observed, "some settlors . . .believe that
knowledge of trust benefits would not be good for younger benefi-
ciaries, encouraging them to take up a life of ease rather than work
and be productive citizens." 177 Trust privacy responds to this desire to
protect beneficiaries from themselves. It allows a settlor to deny bene-
ficiaries knowledge of the trust until they reach the appropriate age,
maturity, and "self-sufficiency"' 78 to handle wealth and all that goes
with it.179
D. Third Parties
Finally, trust privacy can protect interests of survivors who are not
direct beneficiaries of a decedent's trust or will. When an individual
dies, a wide circle of family, friends, colleagues, and even total stran-
gers may feel a wrenching loss. That wrenching loss may well persist
for decades. Consider, for instance, the daughter who grieves each
year on her deceased father's birthday or the crowds that leave flowers
and tears at Graceland, Kensington Palace, and Central Park on the
173 Paris Hilton is joined by her best friend, Nicole Richie, the daughter of singer
Lionel Richie.
174 The Simple Life (FOX television broadcast).
175 Anna Cock, Rich and Relentless, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), July 12, 2003, at 26.
176 See ROTTENBERG, supra note 147, at 115, 118, 158-68 (citing model "inheritors,"
including Leonard Stem, George H. W. Bush, William H. Danforth, Stewart Mott, George
Pillsbury, Jr., Obie Benz, Helen Hunt Hendrix, Alida Rockefeller, and Charles Collins).
177 Kartiganer & Young, supra note 123, at 20.
178 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 cmt. (amended 2005) ("Responding to the desire of some
settlors that younger beneficiaries not know of the trust's bounty until they have reached
an age of maturity and self-sufficiency, subsection (b) (8) allows a settlor to provide that the
trustee need not even inform beneficiaries under age 25 of the existence of the trust.").
179 Beneficiaries face significant psychological as well as financial issues. See ROTTEN-
BERG, supra note 147, at 120-85 (providing an extended discussion of "handling new
wealth" and listing support groups, wealth advisers, therapists, and publications on the
.psychology of inheritance" and money management); T.R. Fehrenbach, "Poor, Little Rich
Kids" Wander Around Aimlessly, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, Oct. 19, 2003, at 3H (reporting
that many of "this generation [who] come into big money ... do not know how to handle
it" and that "[p]sychiatrists ... report that irresponsibility, guilt feelings and lack of inner
discipline .. .are common among the new breed").
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anniversaries of Elvis Presley's, Princess Diana's, and John Lennon's
untimely deaths.8 0 To a survivor, the memory of the deceased may
be so important that " [t] o violate that memory is to invade the person-
ality of the survivor."18' Trust privacy helps preserve that memory by
ensuring that a decedent's final wishes are not exposed to public ridi-
cule, speculation, and censure. In so doing, it can spare survivors the
additional pain that publicity can bring-be it embarrassment, humili-
ation, anger, or disappointment.
Trust privacy may have financial benefits as well for survivors. In
some cases, posthumous marketing of a decedent's image and prod-
ucts may be a multimillion-dollar enterprise.1 8 2 For those involved in
such an enterprise, trust privacy can safeguard their livelihood by
keeping the decedent's reputation unstained. In other cases, trust pri-
vacy may discourage questions about a decedent's mental capacity8 3
that might compromise the transactions in which the decedent en-
180 See Tamer El-Ghobashy, Imagine-The 22nd Vigil, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 9, 2002, at 20
(describing the events in Central Park to commemorate the twenty-second anniversary of
John Lennon's death, including a vigil "around the 'Imagine' circle in Strawberry Fields,
which was bedecked with flowers, flickering candles, and other tributes"); Phil Kloer, Fans
Remember Elvis in Their Prayers, ATL. J.-CoNsT., Aug. 17, 2002, at F1, F4 (reporting that on
the twenty-fifth anniversary of Elvis Presley's death, there was "an honest outpouring of
emotion [at Graceland] ... unlike anything else today," including a "drenched throng" of
70,000 people reciting the Twenty-third Psalm, singing along to Presley's version of the
hymn "How Great Thou Art," and parading past Presley's grave, which was covered with
"[h]uge mounds of flowers ... [,] teddy bears, angel figurines and American flags"); Jo
Willey, Half of Britons Want Di Probe, ExPREss, Sept. 1, 2003, at 6 ("Hundreds of mourners
yesterday marked the sixth anniversary of the death of Princess Diana . . . [and a] sea of
flowers.., from pink carnations to hand-picked posies were left outside her former home
at Kensington Palace by fans from around the world."). Some survivors choose a more
lasting tribute than flowers and tears. For example, Elton John memorialized the tragic
deaths of first Marilyn Monroe and then Princess Diana in a song that has become the
"most popular single of all time," Candle in the Wind Neil Strauss, A Personal Peace for Every
Mourner, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at E5 (discussing the impact of musical tributes, includ-
ing Elton John's Candle in the Wind, Eric Clapton's Tears in Heaven, and Puff Daddy's I'll Be
Missing You).
181 Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000).
182 For a list of the "Top-Earning Dead Celebrities," see Lea Goldman & David M.
Ewalt, Top-Earning Dead Celebrities, FORBES.COM, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/
deadcelebs. Some celebrities actually "do[ ] better in death than in life." Graeme Ham-
mond, Dead Lucky-"Rock Stars Grow in Stature After Death. They Remain Perpetually Sexy, "SUN-
DAY MAIL, Oct. 12, 2003, at 88. Posthumous earnings often come from memorabilia. Id.
(reporting that "95 per cent of [Charles Schulz's] estate's earnings are from stickers and
stuffed animals"); John Tevlin, Love Me Tender; Elvis May Be Dead, But Shrines to His Life Are
Thriving, STAR TRiB., Aug. 16, 2003, at El (listing a wide variety of Elvis collectibles, includ-
ing Elvis pins, mugs, towels, pillows, beer cans, and earrings, and replicas of Graceland).
183 The mental capacity to execute a will "requires less competency than the power to
make a contract or a gift." DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 165. Thus, questions
about the testator's capacity to execute a will may raise questions about the testator's com-
petency to engage in other transactions as well. For discussions of the differing mental
capacity standards for wills and other transactions, see, for example, NancyJ. Knauer, De-
fining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTs. L. REv. 321, 326-29 (2003); Madoff, supra note 113, at 588 n.53.
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gaged or the business where the decedent worked. In still other cases,
trust privacy may benefit a decedent's business associates and employ-
ees by avoiding the need to list the decedent's business assets and in-
terests in the public probate records. There are real concerns that
such listings can give competitors "important information" 18 4 and ad-
vantages and potentially result in a "fire sale" of a decedent's busi-
ness.'8 5 Indeed, one Colorado judge was so persuaded by these
dangers of probate that he took the unusual step 86 of sealing billion-
aire Bob Magness's probate file for three months to facilitate sale of
Magness's stock and landholdings. 18 7 The file supposedly contained
such "sensitive business issues" 18 8  that premature disclosure
threatened financial disaster for Magness's estate, media empire, and
other "operating entities. s18 9
III
THE HUMAN COSTS OF TRUST PRIVACY
Part II has identified possible benefits of trust privacy for trust
insiders and outsiders. This Part shows, however, that these benefits
184 DACEY, supra note 55, at 45.
185 Id. ("When a business interest is involved, competitors may gain important informa-
tion from [probate] records, information which can adversely affect efforts to sell the busi-
ness."); Barkley T. Miller, Wills and Trusts: Boon or Bust?, TEX. LAw., July 27, 1998, at 27
(discussing the disadvantages of listing assets in the public probate files as "especially true
of entrepreneurs, who may be concerned about competitors who wish to purchase a cli-
ent's business or assets in probate when the family may be feeling a cash-flow pinch").
186 John Accola, Judge Seals Huge Estate of TCI Founder Magness, RocK' MOUNTAIN NEws,
Dec. 21, 1996, at 2B (reporting that Judge Thomas C. "Levi said the Magness case was a
rare exception and noted his decision wasn't a permanent seal"); Carol J. Loomis, Dead
Men Tell No Tales: The Secret Will of TCI's Founder, FORTUNE, Jan. 13, 1997, at 72 (stating that
the sealing of Magness's will "may be a first, since wills are by definition public docu-
ments.., one prominent trust and estate lawyer in New York said that in his decades-long
career he had literally never before heard of a will being made 'private'"). But see In re
Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (Ct. App. 1977) (discussing sealing of wills and
probate files).
187 See Accola, supra note 186. Despite efforts by the Denver Post to have the Magness
will unsealed in March 1997, seeJohn Accola, Attorneys Ty to Keep Magness' Will Secret, RocKY
MOUNTAIN NEws, Mar. 21, 1997, at IB, the will remained sealed until lateJune 1997, nearly
six months after the original decision to seal the will. SeeJohn Accola, Magness' Will Un-
veiled, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 13, 1997, at lB.
188 Loomis, supra note 186 (citing arguments of the Magness estate co-personal repre-
sentatives). Apparently, the "sensitive business issues" were the estate's "huge tax liability"
of $500 million. Accola, Magness' Will Unveiled, supra note 187. According to the estate's
attorney, the executors did "not wan[t] for people to know that they ha[d] this enormous
pressure to raise huge sums of cash over what's really a relatively short period of time." Id.
(quoting William S. Huff).
189 Accola, Magness' Will Unveiled, supra note 187. For critiques of the decision to seal
Magness's will, see, for example, id., which quotes a Broadcasting & Cable Magazine editor,
John Higgins, as saying, "It's not clear to me what all the secrecy was about .... I learned a
heck of a lot more about Bob Magness and the problems with his estate by reading the SEC
filings," and Accola, supra note 186, which sets out arguments from the Denver Post's mo-
tion to unseal Magness's will.
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come at a cost-a human cost-for settlors, trustees, beneficiaries,
family survivors, and other third parties.
A. Settlors
For the most vulnerable members of society, trust privacy can cre-
ate significant costs both during life and after death.
1. Lifetime Costs of Trust Privacy
Revocable trusts are supposed to protect deceased settlors' estates
from the high costs of probate.19 0 Yet, for settlors vulnerable to ex-
ploitation-be it due to mental or physical infirmity, dependency,
misplaced confidence, or loneliness' 9 1-use of a revocable trust dur-
ing life may result in little or no estate to protect at death.
For some such settlors, the very purchase of a revocable trust may
lead to financial disaster. Mass marketing of revocable trusts to the
unwary has become "one of the fastest growing consumer blitzes in
the nation." 19 2 These so-called "living trust scams" 19 3 have fleeced mil-
lions of Americans, especially elderly Americans, 194 of their life sav-
ings.19 5 Con artists posing as "certified trust advisors" 19 6 hawk their
190 Indeed, the 1965 book that sparked the living trust revolution was entitled How to
Avoid Probate. DACEY, supra note 20.
191 For an extended discussion of the factors that make settlors vulnerable to exploita-
tion, see Death Planning Made Difficult: The Danger of Living Trust Scams, Hearing Before the
Senate Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. (2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hearing]
(testimony of Paul F. Hancock, Deputy Att'y Gen. for South Fla.), available at http://ag-
ing.senate.gov/events/hr53ph.pdf.
192 John Newsome, District Attorney, El Paso County, Colo., Scam Line: Living Trusts,
http://dao2.elpasoco.com/scam.asp?ifile=livingTrusts (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
193 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Testifies Before Senate Special
Committee on Aging on Living Trust Scams (July 11, 2000), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/livingtrust.shtm; Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General,
Living Trust Scam, http://www.azag.gov/consumer/livetrust.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2007).
194 See Hearing, supra note 191 ("[A]dvances in technology have made it easier for
predators to target their intended victims."). For an extended discussion of how living
trust marketers target the elderly, see id.; Jeanne Finberg, Financial Abuse of the Elderly in
California, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 667, 668-73 (2003). For example, one trust mill, Senior
Estate Services, "obtained from a marketing company the names and addresses of elderly
residents of Florida." Hearing, supra note 191.
195 See CBS Evening News: Scam Artists Setting Up Phony Living Trusts Can Strip Seniors of
Their Life Savings (CBS television broadcast Mar. 14, 2003) (transcript available at LEXIS,
News Library) (discussing how "scam artists are using living trusts to fleece the trusting"
and stating that "California's attorney general says just one company, the Alliance For Ma-
ture Americans, took millions from the elderly").
196 Hearing, supra note 191 (statement of George B. Hoffman, Former Salesman, Alli-
ance for Mature Americans, President, George B. Hoffman Estate and Retirement Plan-
ning, Long Beach, California) (describing his two-day training and his experience as a
.certified trust advisor" for a living trust sales organization); Finberg, supra note 194, at 669
("The scam artists often call themselves 'certified trust advisors' or estate planning experts,
but they are not experts and usually not certified by anyone." (footnote omitted)).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
product as the magic bullet to avoid guardianship, medical costs, cred-
itors, probate taxes, and publicity. 197 Thousands of dollars later,198
the purchaser ends up with a kit of revocable trust documents that is
at best worthless1 99 and at worst a "buyer's 'living hell.'- 200 For exam-
ple, after executing a revocable trust drafted by an out-of-state trust
mill, an Ohio couple discovered that they were no longer able to use
their checking account or pledge their house equity as collateral.20 1
They ultimately had to hire a local lawyer to arrange properly their
affairs. 202
If the would-be settlor transfers personal financial information as
well as cash to such a "certified trust advisor," it may cost the pur-
chaser more than a worthless or defective trust. The would-be settlor
may also become the victim of identity theft203 or a fraudulent invest-
ment scheme. 20 4 As the case of Raymond and Mildred Grossman
197 See Charles F. Gibbs, The Marketing of Living Trusts by Non-Attorney Promoters, 20 AC-
TEC NOTES 193, 193 (1994) ("The public, particularly senior citizens, are told that the
living trust is a cure-all for the problems entailed in asset management and wealth transfer,
a claim with no more validity than the curative claim for snake oil."); Angela M. Vallario,
Living Trusts in the Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Good Thing Gone Bad, 59 MD. L. REv. 595,
598 & n.14 (2000) (describing the "unfulfilled promises" made by living trust marketers);
see also Newsome, supra note 192 (summarizing the misleading claims and representations
that living trust marketers have made and providing the "true facts about those claims").
198 Vallario, supra note 197, at 596 n.3 ("The average cost of the living trust forms is
$2000."); see also Lawrence Walsh, If You Want a Living Trust, Use a Lawyer You Can Trust,
PrrTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 2002, at C4 (stating that Pennsylvania victims of living
trust scams "are pressured into spending $2,000 to $3,000" for living trust kits); TEX.
YOUNG LAWYERS Ass'N, LIVWNG TRUST SCAMS AND THE SENIOR CONSUMER (2002), available
at http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=8273&TEM-
PLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm ("Each year thousands of consumers
lose from $500 to $5,000 through the purchase of living trusts.").
199 See Tom Corbett, Pennsylvania Attorney General, Protecting Consumers: Beware of
Living Trust Scams, http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/consumers.aspx?id=304 (last visited
Nov. 27, 2007) ("Sometimes victims are sold worthless 'kits,' costing several thousand dol-
lars, which are nothing more than standard forms that may or may not be valid, as laws
concerning living trusts vary from state to state."). In some cases, "consumers send money
for these do-it-yourself products, but receive nothing in return." FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, LVING TRUST OFFERS: How TO MAKE SURE THEY'RE TRUST-WORTHY (2000), http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/proO8.pdf.
200 Hearing, supra note 191 (testimony of Esther "Tess" Canja, President of AARP).
201 Trumbull County Bar Assn. v. Hanna, No. 97-1021, 1997 Ohio LEXIS 2448, at *4
(Ohio 1997).
202 See id.
203 Today: Consumer Lawyer Alan Kopit Discusses How To Guard Against Scams When Draw-
ing Up a Living Trust (NBC television broadcast Mar. 5, 2002) (transcript on file with au-
thor) (warning that living trust marketing companies will "find out what your Social
Security number is, your bank account numbers, your credit card numbers, and then
they'll sell that information to other people and all sorts of other problems can result from
the identity theft").
204 For example, "[o]nce the trust-mill salesperson is privy to the consumer's financial
information, the salesperson then recommends that the victim liquidate his or her assets
and purchase insurance or annuity contracts." Vallario, supra note 197, at 596 (footnote
omitted); see also United States v. Williams, No. 01-5031, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22553, at
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reveals, 20 5 the outcome can be truly tragic. Raymond Grossman, an
eighty-year-old retired Methodist minister, and his wife, Mildred, a sev-
enty-nine-year-old retired secretary, had such faith and confidence in
their living trust salesman that they invested their life savings of
$36,900 in bogus securities he recommended. 20 6 "As a result of the
lost investments, the Grossmans: (1) were forced to move from a
condo to mobile home; (2) cannot provide financial help to their chil-
dren; and (3) can no longer afford an assisted living home."20 7
Other vulnerable settlors fall prey to larcenous trustees. One
such trustee was David Stern, a Massachusetts attorney who took ad-
vantage of his "position of trust and confidence" 20 8 to convince long-
time clients, Bertram and Dianne Parker, to name him co-trustee of
their revocable trust.20 9 In a three-year period, Stern transferred
more than $3.5 million out of the Parkers' trust to finance his movie
production business and pay off personal loans. 210
Another recent example of trustee exploitation and theft oc-
curred in New Jersey.211 A mother-son team, Serena and Salvatore
Bono, "persuaded" Laura Niles, "an eighty-eight-year-old, single, de-
mented multimillionairess," to substitute Salvatore for the current
trustee of her three revocable trusts. 2 12 The results were predictable:
"With his newfound power, Bono embarked on a sixteen-month loot-
ing spree of Laura's estate." 21 3
A California trustee went still further in his abuse of a vulnerable
settlor-his elderly mother, Laura Lowrie. 2 14 After his father's death,
Sheldon Lowrie took charge of his mother's finances2 15 and isolated
*2-5 (10th Cir. Oct. 17, 2001) (case involving a living trust marketer who targeted elderly,
unsophisticated victims, acquired information regarding "his victims' financial condition
in his role as their trust advisor," and persuaded his victims to invest in a nonexistent
company); In re Flack, 33 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Kan. 2001) (describing a fraudulent scheme in
which employees of a trust mill "acquired financial information concerning insurance, real
estate, and stocks" owned by their victim, "collected a check for $1,995" for attorneys' fees
related to the estate planning documents, and convinced their victim to liquidate her as-
sets and purchase an annuity).
205 Dep't of Ins. v. Hooley, No. 01-3576PL, 2002 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear., LEXIS 199, at
*21-22 (Jan. 28, 2002) (setting out the Grossman case). Unfortunately, the Grossmans
were only two of many victims of this living trust marketer's "deliberate and largely trans-
parent scheme to swindle Florida residents." Id. at *22; see id. at *10-24 (summarizing
cases).
206 Id. at *21-22.
207 Id. at *22.
208 In re Stern, 682 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Mass. 1997).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 In re Niles, 823 A.2d 1 (N.J. 2003).
212 Id. at 3.
213 Id. at 5.
214 Estate of Lowrie, No. B159305, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2004). A par-
tially published version of the opinion appears at 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2004).
215 Estate ofLowrie, slip op. at 17.
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her from family and friends.21 6 He locked her25 7 in a house that
reeked of urine,218 duct taped her telephones,2 1 9 and posted a sign on
the front door: "DAY SLEEPER, DO NOT DISTURB!! NO SOCIAL
WORKERS. NO PEDDLERS. WILL NOT ANSWER DOOR."220 In
addition, Sheldon denied Laura medical care 22' and refused to assist
her with personal hygiene to the point that her "hair was matted, her
toenails overgrown, she was filthy and disheveled, and she wore dirty
nightgowns. '" 222 During this period, Laura transferred revocable trust
property and other assets to Sheldon, modified her revocable trust
documents so that Sheldon would receive the bulk of her estate, and
stepped down as trustee in his favor. 223 By Laura's death, Sheldon
had stolen more than $665,000 from her revocable trust, bank ac-
counts, and business.224 In a final act of disrespect, he defied his
mother's wishes to be buried next to her husband and donated her
body for medical experimentation. 225
These cases of fraud and abuse are by no means isolated inci-
dents. Indeed, recent reports suggest that in a "greying" 226 America,
exploitation of vulnerable settlors is on the rise. 227 Yet, most of these
cases will never come to light (if at all) until it is too late-after the
settlor has died with a botched trust or a depleted estate. The reason
is trust privacy.
Current trust law declares the privacy of a living settlor and that
individual's revocable trust sacrosanct. Under even the most liberal
216 Id. at 20-22.
217 Id. at 21 ("Sheldon locked the metal security door on decedent's front door from
the outside.").
218 Id. at 24 ("Decedent's home was filthy, feces were splattered on the toilet, the home
smelled of urine, fleas were on the carpet, and decedent's bed was soiled.").
219 Id. at 4, 21.
220 Id. at 21.
221 Id. at 24-25 ("'Sheldon ... failed to take [decedent] to the doctor, notwithstand-
ing that she had become disabled from a fall that occurred three years prior to her
death' . . . . When confronted, Sheldon said there was no need to take decedent to the
doctor because she was fine." (third alteration added)).
222 Id. at 24.
223 Id. at 3; see id. at 16-19 (setting out evidence of financial abuse).
224 Id. at 26. What made this situation even more tragic is that while Sheldon was
spending his mother's money on, inter alia, antique automobiles, he persuaded his mother
that "she was poor and living off of social security." Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks
omitted). As a result, she believed she could not afford even to "replace a broken table, a
broken couch, or a broken television." Id. at 18.
225 Id. at 22.
226 Hearing, supra note 191 (testimony of Paul F. Hancock).
227 This focus on a "greying" America is not meant to suggest that all elderly Ameri-
cans are vulnerable to exploitation. See Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the
Solution a Problem?, 34 MCGEORGE L. REv. 267, 321 (2003) (warning of the dangers of "ster-
eotyping the elderly as vulnerable"). However, because living trust scam artists have delib-
erately targeted senior citizens, see supra note 194 and accompanying text, most of their
victims have been-and will likely continue to be-older Americans.
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definitions of the "duty to inform," only the settlor is entitled to infor-
mation about the trust.22 8 Trust law prizes privacy to such a degree
that it denies those who might protect the settlor and the settlor's
property-the chosen beneficiaries-notice of the trust and informa-
tion about its administration. 229 If the settlor subsequently loses
mental capacity, the very existence of the trust may well remain a se-
cret known only to the trustee and, if the settlor is fortunate, the set-
tlor's legal agent, conservator, or guardian.23 0
Thus, trust privacy may come at a devastating cost to living
settlors. By providing a shield for the unscrupulous, it may leave
vulnerable settlors disqualified from Medicaid, 231 burdened with
unnecessary taxes, 232 destitute,233 or worse-broken in body and
228 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 & cmt. (amended 2005) ("While a trust is revoca-
ble [and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust]. . . .duties of the trustee are owed
exclusively to [ ] the settlor," including "the duty under Section 813 to inform and report"
(brackets in original)).
229 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16064 (West Supp. 2006) ("The trustee is not required
to report information or account to a beneficiary... (b) In the case of a beneficiary of a
revocable trust" for the period when the trust may be revoked); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603
cmt. (amended 2005) (denying beneficiaries the right to information about a revocable
trust "as long as the settlor has capacity").
230 See Foster, supra note 15, at 744-46 (discussing the UTC and California com-
promises that protect the privacy of settlors' trusts after settlors lose capacity). The com-
ment to UTC section 603 emphasizes that the settlor can waive beneficiaries' rights to
information, including notice, if the settlor subsequently loses capacity. UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 603 cmt. (amended 2005) ("However, because this section may be freely overridden in
the terms of the trust, a settlor is free to deny the beneficiaries these rights [to information
under section 813], even to the point of directing the trustee not to inform them of the
existence of the trust.").
231 See Sheryl Harris, Proceed with Care in Setting Up a Living Trust, NEWHOUSE NEWS
SERV., Jan. 15, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File (stating that poorly
drafted living trusts "have made unwitting seniors ineligible for Medicaid nursing home
reimbursement"); Kimberly Lankford, Avoid the Medicaid Trust Abyss, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN.,
Feb. 2004, at 87 (describing a Colorado living trust scam that left settlors ineligible for
Medicaid). Edith Allison, an elderly nursing-home resident in declining health, and her
son, Donald, fell for a living trust scam artist's "flier promising to 'protect your home and
assets from nursing-home costs."' Id. Donald paid $1950 for a living trust and transferred
Edith's assets into the trust. Id. The results were disastrous. Edith's Medicaid application
was denied "because she had too much money to qualify. The problem, Donald learned,
was that [the scam artist] had set up a revocable living trust, not an irrevocable one.
Therefore, all of the assets in the trust still counted in the medicaid calculations." Id.
232 See, e.g., Vallario, supra note 197, at 596 n.5 (reporting that "a trust mill ... sold a
couple in their eighties annuities and recommended that they liquidate their savings
bonds to do so, resulting in a $15,000 taxable gain" (citing Agnes C. Powell, Beware! Living
Trust Scams Do Exist, PRINCE GEORGE'S B.J., Apr. 1999, at 12)); Sara Hansard, Trust Scams
Spur Crackdown: Mills Use High-Pressure Sales To Snare Elderly, INVESTMENT NEWS, July 17,
2000, at 1 ("Walter Kulinski bought a living trust in 1997 from United Seniors Alliance in
Wisconsin and was pressured into transferring $224,000 into annuities that caused him to
pay about $10,000 in capital gains taxes.").
233 See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text (describing the Grossman case).
The financial impact of living trust scams on elderly victims may be particularly devastating.
"Most live on fixed incomes and accumulated savings that must be available to support
them for the remainder of their lives .... Unlike younger Americans who are employed,
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spirit.23 4 As the next section will show, the costs of trust privacy do not
end at a settlor's death.
2. Post-Mortem Costs of Trust Privacy
a. The Price for Protecting the Privacy of Living Settlors' Trusts
For vulnerable settlors, a revocable trust may be a "financial time
bomb ready to go off at death."23 5 The very document that was sup-
posed to preserve their estates for loved ones may end up instead leav-
ing property to strangers-courts, lawyers, and tax authorities.
Here too privacy is to blame. By concealing a living settlor's trust
from view, trust privacy can cause "irreparable" damage after the set-
for's death. 23 6 After death, the settlor can no longer revoke a defec-
tive revocable trust or adopt a new estate plan that implements the
settlor's actual intent. 23 7
Nowhere have these problems emerged more prominently than
in the area of living trust scams. Privacy allows victims to "go to their
graves without realizing they've been swindled."238 And, in so doing,
privacy effectively denies those victims control over disposition of
their property at death. As a Florida deputy attorney general con-
cluded from his investigation of living trust scams, "none of us can
repair the damage that is caused when the purchaser of the trust dies
and, because of legal deficiencies in the trust documents, the de-
senior citizens who lose their assets often lose their sole source of income and continued
subsistence. This wealth cannot be replaced." Hearing, supra note 191 (testimony of Paul
F. Hancock).
234 See Theresa Tighe, Swindlers Zero in on Elderly, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30,
1994, at 1D (stating that many scam victims are too afraid to call the police because they
fear they will be regarded as mentally incompetent and "will be stripped of their indepen-
dence"); supra notes 214-25 and accompanying text (describing the physical, emotional,
and financial abuse of Laura Lowrie).
235 Tom Elden, Living Trust Mills-The Scam That Keeps on Taking, CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION REP., May 1999, at 1, 3.
236 New York State Office of the Attorney General, Living Trusts: What You Should
Know, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/seniors/livingtrust.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2007)
("Even worse, the absence of an effective estate plan may not become apparent until after
the victims of the scam have died, when the harm has become irreparable.").
237 Some courts have responded to these dangers by reforming revocable trusts after
the settlor's death. See, e.g., In reEstate of Robinson, 720 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that "a trust with testamentary aspects may be reformed after the death of
the settlor for a unilateral drafting mistake so long as the reformation is not contrary to the
interest of the settlor"); Walker v. Walker, 744 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Mass. 2001) (granting a
petition to reform a deceased settlor's trust to conform to the settior's intent to minimize
estate taxes).
238 CBS.MarketWatch.com, Getting Personal: Don't Be Swindled by the Latest Estate Plan-
ning Scam, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 27, 2000, http://www.marketwatch.com/search/
?siteid=mktw (search "don't be swindled by the latest estate planning scam") (quoting asset
protection attorney Jay Adkisson).
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ceased's assets are not distributed in the manner that she
intended."23 9
Unfortunately, there are numerous examples of invalid or defec-
tive revocable trusts discovered too late to remedy. For instance, Flor-
ida children learned only after their mother's death that she had
purchased from an out-of-state trust mill a revocable trust that was
invalid under Florida law. 240 The outcome was what the mother un-
doubtedly paid to avoid-"full probate administration" 241 of her es-
tate. Sadly, because the decedent left no will, she died intestate2 42
with her property distributed according to the Florida legislature's no-
tion of an appropriate estate plan rather than her own stated wishes.
Other settlors have died with unfunded revocable trusts. Their
trust marketers either neglected to tell them to transfer property into
the trust243 or botched the transfer. Once again the price of trust
privacy is probate and a depleted estate. For example, a widow (iden-
tified only as "M.M.") bought a revocable trust from Daniel
Schramek, 244 a former medical technician 245 and self-taught parale-
gal246 who sold legal "kits" 247 to the unwary. As part of the transac-
tion, Schramek prepared a quitclaim deed to transfer M.M.'s real
property to the trust.248 By error, he included on the deed a line for
her deceased husband's signature. 249 Schramek "corrected" the prob-
lem by signing the husband's name and notarizing the signature. 2 50
Unfortunately, the defective deed and trust did not come to light until
after M.M.'s death. As a result, her heirs had to probate her estate to
239 Hearing, supra note 191 (testimony of Paul F. Hancock at pt. III).
240 Id. at pt. II.G (discussing a case involving "[a]n elderly resident of Sarasota County,
Florida").
241 Id. (testimony of Paul F. Hancock at pt. II.G).
242 See id.
243 See id. (opening statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Spec. Comm. on
Aging), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr53cg.pdf ("[T]he victim is not told,
in some instances, that to effectuate the living trust, assets must be deeded over to the
trust"); Albert B. Crenshaw, "Living Trust"Peddlers Prey on the Uninformed, WASH. POST, June
18, 2000, at HI ("Assets have to be retitled in the name of the trust or the trust doesn't
apply to them. 'We know in many instances the person who uses these cookie-cutter things
isn't told they've got to fund them.'" (quoting Sally Hurme, AARP program consultant)).
244 See Florida Bar v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1993) (setting out "The M.M.
Incident").
245 Bruce Vielmetti, Questions of Law, Without the Layers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.
26, 1993, at IA (describing Schramek as "a former medical technician and non-lawyer").
246 Williams Yelverton, Largo Man Guilty of Contempt Gets 30 Days in Jail, TAMPA TRIB.,
Feb. 2, 1996, at 1 (describing Schramek as "a self-taught paralegal").
247 Schramek, 616 So. 2d at 980.
248 Id. at 981.
249 Id.
250 Id. Interestingly, Schramek had been convicted only two years earlier of a similar
offense. Id. at 984 (reporting that Schramek had been "convicted of forgery, uttering, and
notary fraud because he forged the signature of another individual on a document and
notarized that same signature" (footnote omitted)).
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clear tide to the property.251 M.M.'s estate lost over $6650 in probate
and other unnecessary expenses. 252
Other victims of living trust scams have left trusts so poorly
drafted that the trusts generate years-even decades-of litigation. As
Judge Joseph S. Mattina has aptly noted from his experience as a New
York Surrogate, such "problem trusts" 253 have had precisely the "op-
posite effect"2 54 their marketers promised-rather than "put[ting]
probate courts out of business . . . , they have increased our busi-
ness. '2 55 A recent Nebraska case is illustrative. In 1979, Loyal and
Veona Sheen bought a trust "kit" and "educational materials" from
Reverend J. H. Schroeder. 256 Twenty-three years later, Nebraska
courts were still attempting to determine the Sheens' intentions from
their ambiguous trust document. 257
A 1998 New York case featured the quintessential "problem
trust." A few months before his death in 1996, Harold Pozarny was
persuaded by a local franchisee with an out-of-state "estate planning
institute" to replace his simple will with a living trust/pour-over will
arrangement.258 What Pozarny received for his money was expensive
litigation after his death and a set of documents the surrogate's court
later described as "the most egregious example of maladroit 'drafting'
this court has encountered."259 Pozarny's trust agreement consisted
of forty-two pages of generic forms in a three-ring loose-leaf binder.
260
The pages were so riddled with errors, inconsistencies, and ambigui-
ties that the court could not even identify the fiduciary2 61 or deter-
mine which loose-leaf pages existed when the trust was originally
signed.262 The tragedy of the case was that Pozarny's intended dispo-
251 Id. at 981.
252 Id.
253 Joseph S. Mattina, The Probate Court and the Non-Probate Revolution, 13 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 409, 413 (1999).
254 Id. at 416.
255 Id.
256 In re Sheen Family Trust, 640 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Neb. 2002); see also Nebraska v.
Schroeder, 384 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Neb. 1986) (affirming trial court judgment against J.H.
Schroeder under the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act and stating that "Schroeder em-
ployed unfair and deceptive acts and practices by misrepresentation in connection with the
promotion and sale of certain purported trust forms").
257 Even before Loyal Sheen's death in 1982, the settlors and beneficiaries filed a peti-
tion "to clarify the intent of the Grantor Creator in creating said Trust." In re Sheen Family
Trust, 640 N.W.2d at 656. For a summary of the twenty-year litigation over the trust, see id.
at 656-58.
258 In re Estate of Pozarny, 677 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716-717 (Surr. Ct. 1998); Mattina, supra
note 253, at 414 (describing the facts of In re Pozarny).
259 In re Pozarny, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 716.
262 Id. at 721-22.
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sition of his million-dollar estate was "straightforward and simple. '26 3
He wanted to leave his entire estate to a close friend and have that
friend serve as his executor.2 64 Yet, the trust he purchased "placed
that dispositive scheme at grave risk. ' 265 Indeed, by the end of the
case, Pozarny's probate assets went to the very nieces and nephews he
had intentionally omitted from his trust and will. 266
In the worst case scenario, victims of living trust scams leave their
loved ones a heavy tax bill as well as a defective trust. For example,
many settlors who create so-called pure trusts, popular tax-evasion
schemes hawked on the Internet, die thinking they have preserved
their assets from income, estate, and gift taxes. 267 In fact, their trusts
may have "truly catastrophic results" for their estates.26 3 Once again,
their survivors learn too late about the scam. Their survivors "figure it
out[] when the IRS imposes stiff penalties and interest-in addition
to the estate tax and prior years' income tax that was supposed to have
been saved. 269
Living trust scam artists are by no means the only scoundrels to
take advantage of susceptible settlors for personal profit. A large cast
of characters-from children 2 70 to lawyers2 7 '-use the veil of secrecy
trust privacy provides to gain control of settlors' assets after death. In
the classic pattern, a close relative, friend, or employee "persuades" a
vulnerable settlor to name her the successor trustee 272 or remainder
263 Id. at 726.
264 Mattina, supra note 253, at 414 (stating that Pozarny's "estate plan could not have
been simpler (he wanted his entire estate to pass to a friend and to have the friend serve as
executor)").
265 In re Pozarny, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
266 Id. at 725-26 (discussing provisions intentionally omitting Pozarny's nieces and
nephews and holding that probate estate assets pass to those nieces and nephews as
Pozarny's intestate heirs). The probate assets amounted to only $60,000 of Pozarny's as-
sets, however. Id. at 716.
267 For descriptions of "pure trust" scams, see, for example, Colorado v. Boyls, 591
P.2d 1315, 1315 (Colo. 1979); Taxpayer Beware: Schemes, Scams, and Cons: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. 9-11 (2001) (statement of Robert L. Sommers, Attorney,
Web site Operator, and Columnist), http://finance.senate.gov/73551.pdf; Brad Burg, Can
You Spot a Phony Trust? Don't Be Too Sure, 76 MED. ECON., Jan. 11, 1999, at 137, 137.
268 Burg, supra note 267, at 142.
269 CBS.MarketWatch.com, supra note 238 (quoting Jay Adkisson).
270 See, e.g., Turja v. Turja, 118 F.3d 1006, 1007 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving a son who
unduly influenced his demented mother to execute a trust as well as other documents in
his favor and who, without informing family members of his mother's death, "conveyed the
family residence to himself pursuant to the trust agreement").
271 See, e.g., PAULA A. MONOPOLI, AMERICAN PROBATE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, IMPROV-
ING THE PROCESs 39-55 (2003) (detailing the notorious case ofJames Gunderson, a Califor-
nia attorney who drafted revocable trusts (and wills) for residents of the Leisure World
retirement community and named himself successor trustee and beneficiary).
272 Apparently, some living trust marketers may do this as well. See Matt Smith, Son of
Super Swindler, S.F. WKLY., Sept. 10, 2003, at 18, 21, 23 (reporting that living trust marketers
claim to be naming an out-of-state trust mill, "Great American Trust[,] as successor trustee
in living-trust documents it was selling to elderly people in California" and that "[u]nder
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beneficiary273 of the settlor's revocable trust. In these cases, the ulti-
mate price for the settlor is not an invalid or defective trust but a trust
that "reflect[s] the will and desires ' 274 of the wrongdoer rather than
those of the settlor.
A Florida case provides a cautionary tale. Muriel Paananen, a vol-
unteer at a retirement center, became a caregiver, "a friend and a
companion" 275 to Erma Jean Carson, an elderly resident who suffered
from Alzheimer's Disease and severe depression.276 Three years later
Erma died with a posthumous surprise for her family: a revocable trust
that transferred her entire estate to her caregiver as remainder benefi-
ciary. 277 No one informed Erma's family when she created the trust,
and, because of the rules protecting the privacy of a living settlor's
trust, no one had to do so. 278 Paananen took every precaution to en-
sure the trust remained a secret during Erma's lifetime. Paananen
hired her own attorney to prepare the trust 279 and directed him not to
disclose its contents to Erma's relatives. 280 After Erma executed the
trust, Paananen took the trust document for "safekeeping."28 1
Paananen then prevented Erma from communicating with her fam-
ily.282 She even instructed the retirement center to "evict" any rela-
tives who tried to visit Erma.28 3
In this case, justice ultimately prevailed. After Erma's death, her
great nieces, who were the residual beneficiaries of her original will,
such an arrangement, Great American Trust apparently could take control of the assets
of ... [a] customer if the person became incapacitated, or died").
273 See, e.g., In reWill of Catelli v. Villone, 825 A.2d 1209, 1214-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003) (finding a nephew unduly influenced his aunt to make him her sole benefici-
ary). In 1996, Anna Villone Catelli, an elderly, bedridden, debilitated, and blind nursing
home resident executed a pour-over will and revocable trust that excluded the benefi-
ciaries of her previous will and named her nephew, Thomas, trustee, executor, and sole
beneficiary of her assets. Id. at 1211-13. The circumstances surrounding these documents
were decidedly "suspicious." Id. at 1214. Thomas, an Arizona truck driver, had his per-
sonal Arizona attorney draft the documents. Thomas did not advise his aunt to consult
with her attorney or any other New Jersey attorney, and "[o]ver the course of ... three
days, while she remained in her bed and dozed on and off, he read the documents to her."
Id. at 1211-12. Apparently, no one else was in the room at the time. "[T]he only person
who could verify that the contents of the documents had been read to her so that she knew
what she was signing was Thomas...." Id. at 1210. Catelli then executed the trust and will
in front of witnesses by "plac[ing] an 'X, on the line Thomas indicated." Id. at 1212.
274 Paananen v. Kruse, 581 So. 2d 186, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
275 Id. at 187.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 See supra Part III.A.2(a) (discussing the costs of protecting the privacy of a living
settlor's trust).
279 Paananan, 581 So. 2d at 187.
280 Id. at 188.
281 Id. at 187.
282 Id. at 188.
283 Id.
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found out about the trust and successfully challenged it as the product
of undue influence. 2 4 As a result, Erma's estate went as she in-
tended-to the beneficiaries of her original will rather than to her
unscrupulous caregiver. 28 5 Other settlors might not be as lucky, how-
ever. Their survivors might never learn about the trust that distorts
their estate plan, let alone contest it. As the next section will show,
the problem once again is trust privacy. For vulnerable settlors, rules
that protect the privacy of deceased settlors' trusts come with a heavy
price. Those rules deny settlors what will testators enjoy-the confi-
dence that the ultimate distribution of their estates "represents [their]
true desires." 286
b. The Price for Protecting the Privacy of Deceased Settlors' Trusts
In theory, the law of trusts prevents distortion of a vulnerable set-
tlor's estate plan. The law protects the settlor from herself and others
by declaring invalid any trust induced by mental incapacity, undue
influence, fraud, or duress.287 In practice, however, trust privacy can
render this protection meaningless, 28 denying survivors the informa-
tion they need to challenge the trust and defend the settlor's actual
intent.
An Illinois case 28 9 illustrates how trust privacy can obstruct a survi-
vor's efforts. Two weeks before his death in August 1979, Martin Wis-
wald amended his revocable trust to cut out the beloved nephew he
regarded as his son 290 and to name his attorney, his accountants, and
their employee sole remainder beneficiaries. 291 The act was admit-
tedly suspicious. At the time Wiswald supposedly amended his trust,
he was a patient at the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, "gravely ill," heavily
medicated, and hooked up to artificial life support systems. 292 The
only question was whether Wiswald's nephew, George, would ulti-
mately be able to challenge the amendment after his uncle's death.
284 Id. at 187.
285 See id.
286 DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 12, at 161.
287 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 406 (amended 2005) ("A trust is void to the extent its
creation was induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence."); id. § 601 ("The capacity re-
quired to create, amend, revoke, or add property to a revocable trust, or to direct the
actions of the trustee of a revocable trust, is the same as that required to make a will.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 11, 12 & cmts. (2003) (stating that trusts can be set
aside for settlor incapacity, undue influence, duress, or fraud).
288 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how trust privacy makes revocable trusts difficult to
challenge).
289 Anderson v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 518 N.E.2d 196 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
290 Id. at 198.
291 Id. at 199. There was a second alleged amendment as well-an unsigned docu-
ment that supposedly "complie[d] with oral directives of" Wiswald to leave his business and
"operating cash up to $25,000" to an employee. Id.
292 Id. at 198.
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Trust privacy presented obstacles at every turn. Wiswald had told
George's mother on several occasions that he had provided for
George in his trust.29 3 George apparently had never seen the actual
trust instrument, however, and did not know whether he was in fact a
trust beneficiary. Even had he wanted to see the trust, he would not
have been entitled to do so during his uncle's lifetime; rules that pro-
tect the privacy of living settlors' revocable trusts deny beneficiaries
access to the trust instrument. 294
Rules keeping a deceased settlor's trust private only compounded
George's problems. Upon his uncle's death, George did not receive a
copy of the trust instrument and its purported amendment or even
notice that the trust existed.295 To preserve trust privacy after a set-
tlor's death, Illinois, like other states, 296 does not "require[ ] that 'rev-
ocable inter vivos trusts to which a legacy is provided' must be filed in
court as a public record, that notice of their contents or amendments
be given to interested parties, or that they be subjected to proof of
authenticity like a will." 297
The trust finally surfaced two months after Wiswald's death, when
his will was filed for probate.298 It devised the bulk of Wiswald's estate
to a trust identified only as "Marquette National Bank Trust No.
7633."299 Once again, however, trust privacy limited access to the
trust. As is common in pour-over will situations, 300 only the will, with
its brief reference to the trust, was included in the public probate
file.301 The actual trust documents that disposed of Wiswald's estate
were not part of the probate proceedings30 2 and remained private.
George's next step was to contact the probate attorney and the
trustees of Marquette National Bank Trust No. 7633 for information
about the trust.30 3 The co-trustees turned out to include none other
than the two accountants, their employee, and the attorney named as
remainder beneficiaries in Wiswald's trust.30 4 For the next five years,
293 Id.
294 See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
295 Anderson, 518 N.E.2d at 201-02.
296 See supra Parts I, II.A. California is a notable exception because it requires notice to
the settlor's heirs. See supra note 110.
297 Anderson, 518 N.E.2d at 202 (quoting Section 13-223 of the Ill. Code of Civil
Procedure).
298 See id. at 201-02.
299 Id. at 198.
-00 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.






the trustees stonewalled. 305 As a court later put it, "there was a con-
certed effort to keep the plaintiff uninformed. 30 6
Eventually, on May 22, 1985, George turned to the courts in
desperation. 30 7 He filed a complaint "at the risk of incurring sanc-
tions because he lacked adequate information. ' 30 Here too trust pri-
vacy presented an initial hurdle. Under rules that protect the privacy
of deceased settlors' trusts, George could not gain access to his uncle's
trust unless he had standing to contest the trust. Yet, the only evi-
dence that demonstrated he in fact had that standing was contained
in the very documents that the trustees "kept ... secret from him. '30 9
Fortunately for George, the trial court nonetheless ordered the trust-
ees to disclose the trust documents, despite their "strenuous objec-
tion" that George "had no standing to sue because he was not a
beneficiary of the trust. '" 31 0
At long last, on January 28, 1986, George received the trust docu-
ments and with them the information he needed to contest his uncle's
suspicious August 1979 trust amendment.31' But George's travails
were not over. The trustees argued, and the trial court agreed, that
even if George's "allegations of fraud in the inducement, fraudulent
concealment, undue influence, lack of mental and physical capacity,
breach of fiduciary responsibility, and other acts of wrongdoing ...
[were] true," he still could not challenge the trust amendment be-
cause his action was time-barred under the statute of limitations. 31 2
Under Illinois law, George had to bring suit within six months after
his uncle's will was admitted to probate.313 He filed his first complaint
over five years after that period expired.314
George's perseverance ultimately paid off, however. A merciful
appellate court found the specific facts of his case so compelling31 5
that it "enlarged '31 6 the statute of limitations to permit him to contest
the trust amendment and defend his uncle's true wishes. Without
305 Id.
306 Id. at 202.
307 Id. at 201.
308 Id. at 202.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 199.
312 Id. at 200.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 The court emphasized four main points: (1) the fiduciary misconduct; (2) the lim-
ited protection afforded to beneficiaries of revocable trusts as opposed to heirs and lega-
tees of wills; (3) the fact that George was challenging only the amendment to the trust, not
the will or original trust; and (4) the "diligence" of George and his attorneys in attempting
to discover his cause of action. Id. at 200-03.
316 Id. at 202-03.
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similar good fortune, other survivors will not be able to do the same
for their vulnerable loved ones.
Martin Wiswald, like nearly all of the deceased settlors whose rev-
ocable trusts make it into the case reporters, 317 left a pour-over will
that specifically referred to his revocable trust. Thus, once his will was
filed for probate, the existence of his trust became public knowledge.
The only issues that remained for his and other such settlors' survivors
were whether the survivors had standing to contest and view the
trust3 18 and whether they had sufficient evidence to support their
claims of settlor incapacity or third-party wrongdoing.3 19 In cases
where no companion pour-over will is filed for probate, the vulnera-
ble settlor's trust may well remain undiscovered and uncontested.
In the end, then, rules that protect the privacy of deceased set-
tlors' trusts may have a perverse effect. Those rules may harm vulnera-
ble settlors and benefit "scheming perpetrators preying on elderly or
infirm people . . . utilizing a revocable trust ... as a vehicle for their
misdeeds."3 20
B. Trustees
Trust privacy can poison the relationship between trustees and
beneficiaries. It can produce a climate of suspicion and conflict
where none needs to exist. Trust privacy puts the trustee in the un-
tenable position of denying a beneficiary's request for funds without
being able to explain why. It can also create the impression that a
trustee is arbitrarily favoring one beneficiary over another when in
fact the trustee is simply following the settor's secret instructions. 321
317 See, e.g., Paananen v. Kruse, 581 So. 2d 186, 187-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); In re
Will of Catelli v. Villone, 825 A.2d 1209, 1214-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); In re
Estate of Pozarny, 677 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716-17, 721-22, 726 (Surr. Ct. 1998).
318 See, e.g., Olson v. Toy, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the
settlor's heirs had standing to contest the validity of her inter vivos trust on grounds of
mental incapacity and undue influence because of the "special circumstances" that the
personal representative of the deceased settlor's estate was also the defendant trustee); In
re Estate of Davidson, 677 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731-32 (Surr. Ct. 1998) (holding that a disinher-
ited distributee had standing to contest his deceased aunt's revocable trust).
319 See, e.g., Graf v. Nelson, No. B160259, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 10833, at *7, *10-20
(Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2003) (ruling that the decedent's niece provided "substantial evidence"
that her elderly incapacitated aunt's pour-over will and revocable trust, which left the bulk
of her estate to her neighbor/caregiver, were the product of her caregiver's undue influ-
ence); Lah v. Rogers, 707 N.E.2d 1208, 1213-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a
beneficiary did not provide clear and convincing evidence that her nephew, who was the
trustee, drafter, and beneficiary of her mother's trust, exerted undue influence).
320 In re Estate of Tisdale, 655 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Surr. Ct. 1997).
321 Particularly problematic are cases where the settlor gives oral rather than written
instructions. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nationsbank Corp., 481 S.E.2d 358, 361 (N.C. Ct. App.
1997) (involving trustees who "contend[ed] that the settior created a private living trust,
the terms of which he instructed his trustees were to be held confidential"); Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 480 S.E.2d 488, 490 (Va. 1997).
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For some trustees, the costs of trust privacy can be personal. Fam-
ily harmony may well be a casualty of trust privacy. For example, a
Virginia trustee denied his brother, a trust beneficiary, information
about their deceased mother's revocable trust on grounds that their
mother had orally "request[ed] that the trust terms and dealings be
kept confidential, even from the beneficiaries. '" 322 The price for hon-
oring the settlor's request32 3 was "'an extremely strained relationship
between' the brothers"324 that ultimately erupted in litigation. 325
For other trustees, trust privacy can create trust administration
problems. Consider, for instance, the case of a loving parent who
wants to protect her child from the temptations of life as a "trust fund
baby."326 Under even the most liberal trust reforms, she is free to di-
rect her trustee to keep the trust secret from a "younger" benefici-
ary. 3 2 7  Yet, as Joseph Kartinager and Raymond Young have
emphasized, with secrecy comes practical difficulties for the trustee.328
"[F]or example, the trustee must tell a child that he or she is not
eligible for financial aid at college because the trust will pay, and must
determine whether to accumulate income at high income tax rates or
pay it out for inclusion in the beneficiary's own return."3 29
Trust privacy can also unnecessarily expose trustees to liability.
When a settlor waives trustee duties to account to and inform benefi-
ciaries, the trustee may ultimately pay the price for trust privacy. The
trustee may lose what Professor Halbach has called "vital protection
from belated claims by beneficiaries whose challenges might ... have
been barred by doctrines of laches or estoppel or by applicable stat-
utes of limitation." 330
Two recent cases illustrate the practical advantage 331 of "proper
disclosure" 332 to beneficiaries. In August 1993, Sylvia McDonald
brought suit on behalf of herself as income beneficiary and her chil-
dren as remainder beneficiaries claiming that the trustees of their
322 Fletcher, 480 S.E.2d at 490.
323 This assumes that the mother in fact made the request.
324 Fletcher, 480 S.E.2d at 490.
325 Apparently, "other facts" not discussed in the opinion also contributed to the
breakdown in family harmony. Id.
326 See supra Part lI.C.3 (discussing settlors' desires to keep trust benefits secret from
their survivors for the survivors' own good).
327 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.B.3(a), 742-47 (discussing UTC reforms). Cali-
fornia is the notable exception. See id. at pt. II.B.3(b), 750-51.
328 Kartiganer & Young, supra note 123, at 20.
329 Id.
330 Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The UTC: Duties of Trustees, UTC NOTES, Winter 2002, at 5,
8.
331 Kartiganer & Young, supra note 123, at 20 (referring to the UTC's "one-year statute
of limitations when the beneficiary is informed of the trust transactions and advised of the
bar if no claim is made within the year").
332 Halbach, supra note 330, at 8.
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family trusts had committed fiduciary breaches during the 1980s by
retaining steadily declining stock.333 The trustees argued that McDon-
ald's suit was barred by Massachusetts's three-year statute of limita-
tions. 33 4 The court concluded otherwise because "none of [the]
children received accountings or other information that would have
alerted them to the trustees' alleged mismanagement of the trusts'
assets."
3 3 5
A 1994 Florida case 33 6 provides a marked contrast. In April 1991,
Diane Davis sued her trustee, Harris Trust Company of Florida (Har-
ris Trust) for failing to distribute trust assets to which she was enti-
tled.3 37 Like the Massachusetts trustees, Harris Trust countered that
Davis's suit was barred by the statute of limitations (here, six
months).338 In this case, however, the court agreed with the trus-
tee.339 It emphasized that Harris Trust had "fully disclosed" the dis-
puted matter to Davis in a June 1989 accounting. 340
The critical distinction between the Massachusetts and Florida
cases was trustee disclosure. Unlike the Massachusetts trustees, the
Florida trustee accounted to the beneficiary and, in so doing, trig-
gered the statute of limitations. 341 Had the settlor of the Florida trust
protected trust privacy by directing the trustee not to account or re-
port to beneficiaries, the trustee could well have suffered a very differ-
ent fate.3 42 These potential dangers of trust privacy to trustees are so
real that official comments to California's Probate Code actually sug-
gest trustees ignore settlor waivers of accounting and reporting re-
quirements: "Notwithstanding being excused from the duty to report
information, the trustee may want to provide information to the bene-
ficiaries in order to start the running of the statute of
limitations .... -343
333 McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 968 F. Supp. 9, 10-13 (D. Mass. 1997).
There were three trusts: a revocable trust created by Sylvia McDonald and an irrevocable
inter vivos trust and a testamentary trust created by her deceased mother. Id. at 10-11.
334 See id. at 13-14.
335 Id. at 14. The trustees ultimately escaped liability, however, because of exculpatory
clauses in the trusts. Id. at 14-15. As the court explained, "The wrongful behavior the
plaintiff asserts was that the defendants retained the Wyman Gordon stock in larger quanti-
ties and for a longer time than might normally be considered prudent. But, unfortunately,
that is exacdy what the exculpatory clauses empowered them to do." Id. at 14.
336 Harris Trust Co. v. Davis, 668 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
337 Id. at 689.
338 Id. at 689-90.
339 Id.
340 Id. at 690.
341 See id. at 689 (finding that the time of accounting was "the latest" the statute of
limitations could have been triggered).
342 See id. ("The jury agreed with [Davis] that the trustees of the trust established for
her benefit had not distributed to her all of the assets to which she was entitled.").
343 CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 16064 cmt. (West Supp. 2006).
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Privacy can conflict with trustees' fundamental fiduciary obliga-
tions to beneficiaries. For example, recent legislation or terms of a
particular trust instrument may limit notice to current trust benefi-
ciaries. 344 Yet, trustees who act accordingly may end up violating their
duty of impartiality to other beneficiaries. As an adviser to the UTC
Drafting Committee stated, "At some point, favoring current benefi-
ciaries over future beneficiaries without notice to the future benefi-
ciaries results in an abandonment of impartiality exposing the trustee
to surcharge for violating trust standards. '34 5
Even an exculpatory clause in the trust instrument may not be
sufficient to save the trustee who protects trust privacy at the expense
of her duties to beneficiaries. The battle over Tylenol magnate Henry
Slack McNeil's $300 million trust is illustrative. 346 In 1959, McNeil
established a discretionary trust for his wife, lineal descendants, and
their spouses. 347 The trust instrument gave the trustee "extraordina-
rily broad authority,"348 declared that trustee decisions were "not sub-
ject to review by any court, '349 and "relieve[d] the trustees of all
personal liability except for gross negligence or willful
wrongdoing." 350
McNeil's oldest child, Hank, "the black sheep of the family, '351
did not learn until 1995 that he was a current beneficiary of the
trust.352 In the early years, McNeil himself misled his children into
thinking they were mere remainder beneficiaries with no rights to dis-
tribution from the trust until after their mother's death.353 Later, the
344 For example, Missouri's version of the UTC allows the settlor to waive notice to all
but a "permissible distributee [of an irrevocable trust] who has attained the age of twenty-
one years." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105.2(8) (West Supp. 2006). "'Permissible distributee'
means a beneficiary who is currently eligible to receive distributions of trust income or
principal, whether mandatory or discretionary." Id. § 456.1-103(15). Under July 2006
amendments, Missouri now allows the settlor to restrict notice to "one or more permissible
distributees... in lieu of providing the notice... to any other permissible distributee who
is an ancestor or lineal descendant of the designated permissible distributee." 2006 Mo.
Laws 649.
345 MICHELLE W. CLAYTON, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, EN.
ACTING THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE 11 (2003), http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/
estate/2003/3/clayton.pdf (quoting Raymond Young).
346 McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d 190 (Del. Ch. 2001), affd in part and rev'd in part,
McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503 (Del. 2002).
347 McNeil v. McNei64 798 A.2d at 506.
348 Id. at 508.
349 Id. at 509 (citing Article III(e) of the trust).
350 Id. (quoting Article IV(c) of the trust).
351 Brigid McMenamin, Black Sheep Beats Bank, FORBES, Sept. 17, 2001, at 60, 60 ("He'd
been the black sheep of the family ever since his youth; he dropped out of business school,
quit his job, divorced his wife and had used cocaine.").
352 McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d 190, 203 (Del. Ch. 2001).
353 McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d at 506; see also McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 195 (stating
that both parents told their children the trust was "'mother's trust"' and as a result the
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trustees, who were McNeil's "close confidants,"3 5 4 continued the de-
ception 355 but only with respect to one child-Hank. In 1979, the
trustees notified Hank's brother and sisters of their statuses as current
eligible beneficiaries of the trust3 56 and subsequently met with them,
provided information about the trust's account balance, holdings, and
distributions, and involved them in the trust decision-making pro-
cess. 357 To this day, Hank might have still believed he was a remain-
der beneficiary had he not fortuitously received a carbon copy of a
letter one of the trustees intended to send only to his siblings. 358
Although the trust instrument did not specifically direct the trust-
ees to keep Hank "in the dark,"3 59 the trustees may have done so be-
cause both the trust settlor (McNeil) and principal beneficiary 360
(Hank's mother) did not want him to know he was entitled to trust
benefits. 36 1 Indeed, both parents effectively disinherited him from
their wills. 3 6 2 Hank was not only estranged from his family but also
children did not think "they were entitled to apply for additional funds from the Lois
Trust").
354 McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 195.
355 See McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d at 511 (referring to the trustees' "pattern of decep-
tion and neglect over a span of many years"). The court acknowledged that "it was defensi-
ble for some of the trustees who served later on to assume that notification had already
been accomplished." Id. at 510. "Nevertheless, both PNC and Wilmington Trust, institu-
tional trustees with policies of notification, should have known better. Moreover, Henry's
repeated attempts to get information should have put the trustees on notice that he did
not know he was a current beneficiary." Id.
356 See McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 197-98 (reproducing "pertinent part[s]" of the
1979 letter).
357 Id. at 199-200.
358 Id. at 200 ("By mistake, Brodhead carbon copied 'Henry S. McNeil' and therefore a
copy was sent to [Hank], being by then the only living McNeil Family member by that
name.").
359 McMenamin, supra note 351, at 60.
360 Strictly speaking, Lois McNeil was only one of several beneficiaries entitled to dis-
cretionary trust distributions. See supra note 347 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the
trustees "administered the Lois Trust with a nearly exclusive focus on Lois during her life-
time" and adopted a policy of "total deference to Lois," "bending completely to [her]
wishes," and the trustees "let [her] run the show." McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 192, 213,
217, 221. The McNeil children "felt that the Lois Trust was 'mother's trust,'" id. at 195,
217, and "Lois regarded [the trust] as 'her' Trust," id. at 206 (footnote omitted).
361 See McMenamin, supra note 351 ("Perhaps some of the trustees didn't go out of
their way to tell Hank he was a beneficiary because his parents didn't want him to know.").
Despite the broad discretion the trust instrument gave them, the trustees deferred to the
wishes of Henry McNeil, Sr., McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 194, and then Lois McNeil, see
supra note 360 (discussing the trustees' deference to Lois McNeil).
362 McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 507 (Del. 2002) ("A direct result of this estrange-
ment was that Hank received nothing under his father's will and, upon the later death of
his mother, only two million dollars, a paltry sum in comparison to that received by his
siblings."); see also Ann Davis, Feud Fractures Family of Late Tylenol Magnate, DESERET NEWS,
July 27-28, 1999, at D7 ("His son's offenses, in his father's view, included using his kids as
pawns in a nasty custody battle and shunning a traditional career path. Henry Jr., known
as Hank, also had a cocaine problem. It didn't help matters that Hank sent his father
scathing letters accusing him of being a bad dad."). After Hank learned that his mother
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had a history of lavish spending on expensive habits36 3 and hobbies,
including national champion retriever dogs and a museum-quality col-
lection of minimalist art.364 Unemployed since the early 1970s, Hank
was the quintessential trust fund baby. 365 He managed to go through
more than $20 million of trust income (from his separate trust) and
still land in debt.3 6 6
In 1997, Hank sued the trustees for failing to inform him of his
rights under the trust and for giving his siblings preferential treat-
ment.3 67 Despite the fact that the case involved a decidedly unsympa-
thetic plaintiff368 and a trust with a broad exculpatory clause, the
trustees ended up the losers. In what Forbes magazine described as a
"public flogging . . . that is a rare horror in private banking," 369 a
Delaware judge ordered the trustees to return one-fifth of their fees
from administering the trust and provide Hank (and his children) a
"make-up distribution" from the trust of more than $5 million.370 The
judge even removed one trustee, PNC Bank.3 71 McNeil's efforts to
insulate his trustees from 'judicial second-guessing and the threat of
monetary liability"3 72 proved futile. As the Delaware Supreme Court
explained, the exculpatory clause did not excuse the trustees from
performing "duties to furnish information and to act impar-
"left him virtually nothing," he sued his sister and her husband (Barbara and Henry Jor-
dan) for "tortious interference." Id. He argued that theJordans had prevented his mother
from "chang[ing] her Will in order to give [him] a share of her estate and the Marital
Trust equal to that of his siblings." McNeil v. Jordan, 814 A.2d 234, 237 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002). Hank was unable to provide sufficient evidence of his mother's intent, however. Id.
at 240 (upholding the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint for lacking "sufficient
allegations . . . relating to Mrs. McNeil's intent").
363 Davis, supra note 362 (discussing "his descent into cocaine addiction").
364 Bishop v. McNeil, No. 15508, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 186, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 14,
1999) (referring to Hank as "a highly capable collector of minimalist art and handler of
national champion retrievers"); id. at *15 n.3 (describing Hank's minimalist art collection
as "considered quite outstanding and of museum quality by respected art experts").
365 See id. at *65 ("In essence, [Hank] has chosen to remain a well-funded ward of his
Trustees. Rather than pursuing an income-generating profession, [Hank] chose to live
solely off the Trust.").
366 Id. at *10, *15.
367 McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d 190, 192, 207 (Del. Ch. 2001).
368 McMenamin, supra note 351 ("Henry S. (Hank) McNeil, 58, may not be the most
appealing plaintiff."); see also McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 221 (referring to Hank's "feisty
litigation-based strategy and maximalist appetite for distributions"); id. at 216 n.58 (stating
that when Hank "was asked what he had done with the $20 million in distributions he had
received . . . [h]e could not even identify his expenditures by categories to the nearest
million, much less in greater detail").
369 McMenamin, supra note 351.
370 McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 223.
371 Id. The Court of Chancery decision also named a replacement trustee for PNC but
the Delaware Supreme Court reversed this portion of the decision as inconsistent with the
settlor's directives in the trust instrument. McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 514 (Del.
2002).
372 McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d at 197.
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tially . . . [w]hatever may have been McNeil, Sr.'s intention in this
regard .... ,,373
Trustees can confront similar fiduciary problems and potential
liability in another context: where one trust beneficiary's right to pri-
vacy conflicts with other trust beneficiaries' rights to information.37 4
For example, when a trustee makes a discretionary trust distribution
to one of several trust beneficiaries, he owes the beneficiary who re-
ceived the distribution a "duty of confidentiality."3 75 As in the McNeil
case, 376 however, the trustee also owes other trust beneficiaries duties
of impartiality and information, including "relevant, general informa-
tion concerning the bases upon which the trustee's discretionary judg-
ments have been or will be made. T3 7 7
Putting these competing fiduciary duties into practice can be a
difficult balancing act. What exactly must the trustee disclose to meet
his obligations to other beneficiaries? Must he disclose all factors that
influenced his decision, including information that invades the recipi-
ent beneficiary's privacy, such as the beneficiary's medical condition,
marital problems, 378 financial difficulties, nonmarital dependents,
standard of living, and other resources?3 79 Trust law offers little gui-
373 McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d at 509.
374 CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., LORING: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK § 5.4.1.1, at 218-19
(2006) (discussing the conflict).
375 Id. §§ 5.4.1.1, 6.2.3, at 216-19, 360-61 (referring to the trustee's "duty of confiden-
tiality," which is "an incident of the trustee's duty of loyalty").
376 See supra notes 367-73 and accompanying text (discussing trustees' violations of
their duties of impartiality and information to Hank McNeil).
377 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50(1) cmt. b (2003).
378 ROUNDS, supra note 374, § 5.4.1.1, at 219 ("Is someone with a remote contingent
remainder interest, for example, entitled to all the information that the trustee was privy to
when a discretionary distribution to a permissible life beneficiary was made? That informa-
tion might include medical information or intimate details of the beneficiary's marital
situation.").
379 "The trustee has a duty.., to ascertain the beneficiary's needs .. " RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. e(1) (2003). The trustee who makes trust distributions to a
beneficiary without inquiring into that beneficiary's actual circumstances may end up lia-
ble for breach of fiduciary duty to that beneficiary or to other beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Feibelman v. Worthen Nat'l Bank, 20 F.3d 835, 836-37 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming the
surcharge of a trustee for "reckless indifference" to the remainder beneficiary's interest
where the trustee made payments to the income beneficiary out of trust principal without
inquiring into the income beneficiary's "standard of living" and other resources); Marsman
v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1027, 1030 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that "a trustee, hold-
ing a discretionary power to pay principal for the 'comfortable support and maintenance'
of a beneficiary... [violated his] duty to inquire into the financial resources of that benefi-
ciary so as to recognize his needs"). This duty to inquire raises another privacy-related
problem for the trustee: To what extent must the trustee invade a beneficiary's privacy to
satisfy the "duty to inquire"? Trust law provides only general guidelines. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. e(1) (2003) ("The trustee generally may rely on the benefici-
ary's representations and on readily available, minimally intrusive information requested of
the beneficiary. This reliance is inappropriate, however, when the trustee has reason to
suspect that the information thus supplied is inaccurate or incomplete."). Apparently, a
trustee must go beyond sending a beneficiary a questionnaire, see Marsman, 573 N.E.2d at
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dance. For instance, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts states: "Ap-
propriate disclosure can usually be provided in general terms that
allow reasonable protection for confidential, private, or sensitive in-
formation."380 A trust treatise perhaps sums up the trustee's dilemma
best: "There are no easy answers."'381 Yet, the penalty for a wrong an-
swer can be catastrophic.
Thus, for the conscientious trustee, trust privacy creates conflicts
in fiduciary duties-conflicts in duties to settlor and beneficiary and
in duties to multiple beneficiaries. For the unscrupulous trustee, how-
ever, trust privacy provides opportunity and cover for wrongdoing. As
the next section will show, a "trustee who may operate in secret is
essentially unaccountable." 38 2
C. Beneficiaries
The plight of beneficiaries has captured the headlines. Recent
years have seen dramatic charges of trustee mismanagement or out-
right theft of funds that were supposed to support a decedent's closest
or most vulnerable survivors. These cases feature some of this coun-
try's greatest fortunes and most prominent families and professionals.
Hyatt heir Robert Pritzker, for example, has been accused of "raping
and pillaging the trusts of [his] two tiny children. ' 38 3 Grocery store
magnate John F. Schwegmann has been surcharged $5 million for us-
ing his half-sister's trust as his personal piggy-bank.38 4 Banker's Trust
allegedly "was asleep at the wheel"38 5 as diamond dealer Harry Win-
ston's trust for his heirs lost over $1 billion.38 6 And, in a case that
1030 (discussing Boyden v. Stevens, 188 N.E. 741 (Mass. 1934)), or "request[ing] only in-
come/expense information," Austin v. U.S. Bank of Wash., 869 P.2d 404, 409 n.7, 411
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994). The trustee may well encounter resistance from the beneficiary.
For example, the trustees of jeweler Harry Winston's trust had to "serve [ ] a notice of
discovery and inspection on [Bruce Winston, the income beneficiary and brother of one of
the trustees] to compel him to produce tax returns, bank statements, canceled checks and
other financial documents." In reEstate of Winston, 613 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
380 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. e(1) (2003).
381 ROUNDS, supra note 374, § 5.4.1.1, at 219.
382 Id. at 218.
383 Jodi Wilgoren & Geraldine Fabrikant, Knives Drawn for a $15 Billion Family Pie, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at Al (quoting "a person close to Liesel" [Pritzker's daughter]). On
January 6, 2005, the Pritzkers reached a settlement agreement, under which Robert
Pritzker's children, Liesel and Matthew, each received approximately $450 million. Mark
Maremont, Pritzkers Settle Family Lawsuit; Cost: A Fortune, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2005, at B1.
384 Ronette King, Grocery Store Heir Told To Pay $5 Million; Sister Was Denied Schwegmann
Cash, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 28, 2005, at Cl.
385 Beard, supra note 120, at 26 (quoting Bruce Winston's attorney, Paul Wexler).
386 Thus far, Harry Winston's son and trust beneficiary, Bruce Winston, has been un-
successful in proving these charges in his $1.3 billion suit against Deutsche Bank, the suc-
cessor to Banker's Trust. See Estate of Winston, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 2003, at 27 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
2003) (conditionally granting a motion to preclude Bruce Winston from introducing evi-
dence at trial in support of his allegations "unless he provides [Deutsche Bank] with a
responsive bill of particulars"). The court observed that "[i] n the main, Bruce's responses
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"abounds with tragedy, '3 8 7 retired Paul Weiss partner Allan Blumstein,
out of "personal greed and a fear of disappointing his wife,"3 8 8 looted
the family trust that was intended to support his elderly aunt who suf-
fered from dementia. 38 9 Rather than paying his aunt's nursing home
bills, Blumstein used trust funds "to maintain the affluent lifestyle for
his wife and family that he could not sustain after his retirement. '390
These cases of trustee misconduct are by no means limited to the
rich and famous. As trusts become the middle-class estate planning
device of choice,3 91 beneficiaries from all walks of life confront trustee
indifference, mismanagement, high fees, and malfeasance. 392 Con-
sider, for example, the sixty-eight-year-old widow whose income de-
rived solely from a $200,000 trust created thirteen years earlier for her
benefit.3 9 3 When she asked for $20,000 to pay for major dental work,
the trustee responded by telling her to have her teeth pulled.39 4
Under the law of trusts, the beneficiary is the first-and often
last-line of defense against an incompetent, partial, stingy, or larce-
nous trustee.3 95 Only an informed beneficiary can fulfill this role as
monitor and enforcer of trusts.3 96 Yet, rules that protect trust privacy
deny the beneficiary the very information necessary to determine
whether a trustee properly invested and distributed trust assets-ac-
cess to the entire trust instrument that defines trustee duties and ben-
eficiary rights. 397 Indeed, some states perversely allow the beneficiary
are ambiguous, inadequate and noncompliant .... If indeed Bruce intends to offer no
proof with respect to certain of the specific allegations in his objections, as several answers
suggest, then those allegations should be withdrawn." Id.
387 In re Blumstein, 801 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (quoting the Hearing
Panel's report).
388 Id. at 301.
389 Id. at 300-01.
390 Id. at 301.
391 McNamee, supra note 120, at 228 ("[T]rusts are becoming the estate-planning tool
of choice for Middle America."); see also Dobris, supra note 19, at 563-67 (discussing the
massification" or "pedestrianization of trusts").
392 See supra notes 117-22 (discussing beneficiary complaints against trustees).
393 See Beale, supra note 125, at 1 (reporting the case).
394 Id.
395 See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 961, at 3-4 (rev. 2d ed. 1983) ("[O]nly the beneficiary has the right and power
to enforce the trust and to require the trustee to carry out the trust for the sole benefit of
the beneficiary .... ."); 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT & WILLLAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 200, at 209 (4th ed. 1988 & Supp. 2001 (Mark L. Ascher & Margit T. Rigney
eds.)).
396 See English, supra note 23, at 199 ("[O] nly by being informed can the beneficiaries
know of and enforce their interests."); Gallanis, supra note 23, at 19 ("As long as trust law
locates the power of enforcement with the beneficiaries, they must have the information
necessary for them to perform that enforcement function.").
397 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.B.3 (discussing beneficiaries' need for direct ac-
cess to the trust instrument and pro-privacy rules that limit access). "The trust instrument
has been aptly called the 'most fundamental information' about a trust." Id. at 739 (quot-
ing U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Duling, 592 P.2d 257, 265 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (Buttler, J.,
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to see only the trust provisions that the trustee-the very individual
who may have wronged the beneficiary-deems relevant to that bene-
ficiary.398 These rules create significant risks to beneficiaries. As one
court explained:
[W]ithout access to the Trust Agreement .... the beneficiary has
no basis upon which he can intelligently scrutinize the Trustees' in-
vestment decisions . . . . The beneficiary is unable to evaluate
whether the Trustees are discharging their duty to use 'reasonable
care and skill to make the trust property productive' . . . [or] to
assure the Trustees are discharging their 'duty to deal impartially'
with all the beneficiaries within the restrictions and conditions im-
posed by the Trust Agreement. 399
The potential for harm to beneficiaries only escalates when they
do not even know that a trust exists in their names. In such circum-
stances, unscrupulous trustees can-and do-loot trusts. Consider,
for example, the Oregon daughter who discovered on her twenty-first
birthday that she had been the beneficiary of two trusts created for
her educational needs.40 0 While she remained in the dark, her trus-
tee-father spent her trust funds on family travel, clothing, medical ex-
penses, birthday gifts, ballet tickets, and even his expenses for
attending a Canadian Rotary Club meeting.40
Similarly, for thirty-four years, two Georgia children, Lorrie Anne
Goldston and Scott Warren Zeigler, had no idea that their father had
named them as the beneficiaries of his trust.40 2 In direct violation of
trust terms, their bank trustee never provided them with trust ac-
counts, annual reports, or information; never used trust assets for
their support during childhood; and never distributed trust principal
when they reached age twenty-one. 40 3 Instead, the bank sold the trust
dissenting)). "It records the original 'deal between settlor and trustee."' Id. (quotingJohn
H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 650 (1995)).
"Moreover, because nearly all trust laws are mere default rules that the settlor can override
in trust provisions, the trust instrument may well be the principal source of law governing
trust and trustee." Id. at 739-40 (footnote omitted). See Langbein, supra, at 650
("[V]irtually all trust law is default law-rules that the parties can reject. The rules of trust
law apply only when the trust instrument does not supply contrary terms." (footnote omit-
ted)); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
641-43 (2004) (discussing default and mandatory trust rules and stating that "[t]he rules
of internal trust governance, which determine the rights inter se of the beneficiaries, the
settlor, and the trustee, are for the most part default as to the settlor" (footnote omitted)).
398 See supra note 15 (discussing the UPC approach).
399 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 480 S.E.2d 488, 492 (Va. 1997) (citations omitted).
400 Jimenez v. Lee, 547 P.2d 126, 130 (Or. 1976) (en banc).
401 Id. at 131.
402 Goldston v. Bank of Am., 577 S.E.2d 864, 867-68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). The trust
was an irrevocable, court-ordered trust created pursuant to a divorce action between the
children's parents.
403 Id. at 867.
2008]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
property to their stepmother for less than fair market value and kept
the proceeds "for [its] own use. "404
In the end, the Georgia children discovered their trust only by
accident. In the process of settling their incapacitated mother's af-
fairs, Goldston found trust documents among their mother's impor-
tant papers. 40 5 Other beneficiaries would not be so lucky. They
would never learn of a loved one's munificence or a trustee's failure
to carry out her wishes. Yet, under recent reforms to promote trust
privacy, 406 some states have removed even the most basic protection
for beneficiaries-knowledge that a trust exists.40 7 These states have
left to the settlor's discretion whether current and future beneficiaries
are entitled to any notice whatsoever. 408 Trust privacy thus can leave
beneficiaries at the mercy of trustees by insulating trustees from any
outside supervision or accountability.
For beneficiaries, the costs of privacy are rapidly becoming pro-
hibitive. In today's changing trust environment, the "benevolent god-
parent"40 9 model of trustee is disappearing and with it the intricate
404 Id. at 867-68.
405 Id. at 868.
406 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. III.A.4 (discussing reforms).
407 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 395, § 961, at 3 ("[T]he trustee is under a duty to
notify the beneficiary of the existence of the trust so that he may exercise his rights to
secure information about trust matters and to compel an accounting from the trustee."
(footnote omitted)).
408 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. III.A.4 (discussing settlor waiver of notice
provisions).
409 See Demetrios Datch, "Merger Mania" and the Demise of the "Benevolent Godfather" Trus-
tee: How a Changing Corporate Environment Has Affected Trust Beneficiaries Across the Country
(2002) (previously published supervised research paper on file with Heirs, Inc.); see also
Dobris, supra note 19, at 551-54 nn.44 & 47-48 (discussing the tradition of the "gen-
tleman" trustee and presenting an "elegy for the noble trustee").
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web of social, 410 moral, 4 1  and legal norms that traditionally en-
couraged compliance and generosity. The shift from individual to in-
stitutional trustee and the accompanying loss of a trustee's personal
connection to both settlor and beneficiary significantly compounds
the problem. 412 Indeed, in an era of recurrent bank mergers, the situ-
ation is only becoming worse for beneficiaries and the need for infor-
mation more urgent. 413 The friendly local banker a settlor chose to
manage funds for the settlor's nearest and dearest may well be re-
410 SeeTamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209,1221 (1995)
(discussing the "[s]ocial and collegial pressures on the fiduciary" that "may be effective in a
stationary society, in which everyone knows the fiduciary, his history, and his family").
"The fiduciary's family members or members of his professional club who seek to maintain
their collective reputation will monitor his performance. As these sources of information
and monitoring disappear in a mobile society, however, fiduciary relationships with stran-
gers become far more risky to entrustors." Id. The disappearance of this "community ap-
proach" harms beneficiaries as well. For example:
[An] elderly widow who was also the beneficiary of a trust fund . . .ex-
pressed concern about her bank trustee and its departure from a "commu-
nity approach." For example, the [widow] attended church and
community events with the employees of the community bank that man-
aged the [widow's] trust fund. In addition, the convenient location of the
community bank made it easy for the [widow] to stop in on a periodic basis
while "performing routine errands" and to discuss the status of the trust
account. However, when the community bank was absorbed by a larger
bank, the management of the trust account was split between two offices in
two different cities: "one [office managed] the status of the actual trust ac-
count in city 'X' 100 miles away, and another [office acted as] the new
trustee in city 'Y" 100 miles from city 'X."' The elderly widow's age and
infirmity prevented her from commuting a long distance to check on the
status of her trust fund.
Datch, supra note 409, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
411 See Dobris, supra note 19, at 548 ("High-mindedness in trust law is fading like an old
picture in a family album. Putting it differently, there seems to be an erosion in fiduciary
responsibility in the trust world ...."); id. at 549-60 (presenting "'proofs' of the erosion of
fiduciary responsibility"). As Professor Leslie has observed, "Fiduciary duties are most ef-
fective when they function both as legal rules and moral norms." Melanie B. Leslie, Trust-
ing Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEo. L.J. 67, 70 (2005). Yet,
the current trend in trust law scholarship and legislation is "to reconceptualize fiduciary
duties as simple default rules, divorced of any normative content ...." Id. at 119. This
trend threatens further erosion of the traditional moral and social constraints on fiduciary
conduct. Id. at 70.
412 See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 767, 774-75 (2000) (discussing "[t]he shift from personal to institutional trustees").
As Professor Alexander observes, "Two-hundred years ago, trustees were individuals with
whom the trustor had a long-term personal relationship. Today, the vast majority of trusts
are administered by large financial institutions, such as trust companies and trust develop-
ments of commercial banks." Id. (footnote omitted).
413 One response has been to liberalize the rules for removal of trustees. See IND. CODE
ANN. § 30-4-3-29(e) (LexisNexis 2000) (permitting beneficiaries to "petition the court for
the removal of a corporate trustee if there has been a change in control of the corporate
trustee after the date of the execution of the trust . . . [and] the removal is in the best
interests of all the beneficiaries of the trust"); In re Fleet Nat'l Bank's Appeal from Proba-
tion, 837 A.2d 785, 795 (Conn. 2004) (stating that Connecticut's reform of trustee removal
legislation had "its genesis in the bank acquisitions and merger phenomenon of the 1990s"
(footnote omitted)).
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placed after the settlor's death with a bank trust department located
hundreds-even thousands-of miles away. 414
Ironically, at the time when beneficiaries most need informa-
tion,415 legislators and courts are restricting their access to informa-
tion.416 For the sake of trust privacy, beneficiaries are left dependent
on the kindness of strangers.
D. Third Parties
Finally, trust privacy can harm those who are not direct benefi-
ciaries of a settlor's trust. Consider, for example, eighty-nine-year-old
South Carolina widow, Olive Deal, who discovered too late that her
husband, John, had amassed and transferred millions of dollars to a
revocable trust.41 7 Through use of a trust, John kept his wealth a se-
cret from Olive. 418 As a result, for most of their fifty-year marriage, he
"made his wife live a life of poverty, '4 19 even having her buy day-old
bread to save money.420
Trust privacy may also deny third parties and family members
money they deserve. For instance, financial institutions, transfer
agents, title insurance companies, purchasers of trust property, and
other third parties dealing with the trust or trustee require confirma-
tion of the trust's existence and the trustee's authority to engage in a
particular commercial transaction. 421 Trust privacy can deprive such
parties of the basic information they need to evaluate whether or not
414 See McNamee, supra note 120, at 228 ("[T]hese days it's unlikely that granddad [the
trust settlor] would know the trustee, either. Waves of mergers have swallowed up local
institutions, and a trust placed with a friendly banker in Elwood, Ind., might now be man-
aged in Detroit.").
415 As Professor Dobris has observed, "Fewer and fewer people believe in fiduciary
duty, unless someone is watching." Dobris, supra note 19, at 549.
416 See Foster, supra note 15, at pts. II.B.3, III.A (discussing recent reforms that have
promoted privacy at the expense of beneficiary access to information).
417 See Andrea Weigl, Widow Battles University for Spouse's Secret Fortune, GREENVILLE
NEWS, Sept. 29, 1999, at lB. John Deal transferred $3.4 million to a revocable trust. Id.
The funds were to be used by the University of Missouri "on scholarships for students who
live in Livingston County in northeast Missouri, where John Deal grew up." Pat Healy,
Widow Sues U. Missouri System for Husband's Contribution, U-WIRE, Oct. 5, 1999. Deal also
created three irrevocable trusts totaling $2.3 million for the benefit of his alma mater, the
University of Kansas. Weigl, supra.
418 Widow's Cash Battle, BELFAST NEWS LETrER, Oct. 2, 1999, at 3 ("Olive Deal ... was
unaware her husband, John, had amassed a fortune until he fell ill in 1997."). John Deal,
who suffered from Alzheimer's disease, was declared incompetent in 1997. Healy, supra
note 417. Deal's nephew, Mark Langdon, was appointed conservator of his estate. Weigl,
supra note 417. "Langdon discovered the $3.4 million trust one day as he sifted through
financial records." Healy, supra note 417.
419 Healy, supra note 417 (quoting Ned Nicholson, Olive Deal's attorney).
420 Weigl, supra note 417 ("'Do you know that he had me buying day-old bread?' Olive
Deal said when family members told her how much money was in the estate, according to
court records.").
421 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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to deal with the trust or trustee in the first place or, in the event of a
breach of contract, to enforce their rights.
Similarly, in theory, a settlor's creditors-be they a bank that
loaned money,422 a nurse that provided round-the-clock care,423 an
accident victim, 424 a spouse, 425 or a child 426-can reach the assets of a
settlor's revocable trust during the settlor's life and, increasingly, after
the settlor's death.427 In nearly every state today, however, this turns
422 See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1979) (holding that a bank that loaned the settlor $75,000 could reach assets in the
settlor's revocable trust after his death to pay the settlor's debt to the bank).
423 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 588 P.2d 1096, 1097-99 (Or. 1978) (holding
that a "practical nurse" could reach assets of a deceased settlor's revocable trust "to recover
wages due her for nursing services rendered to" the settlor and his wife).
424 See, e.g., In re Estate of Nagel, 580 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1998) (holding that the
executor of a deceased car accident victim's estate could reach the deceased settlors' revo-
cable trust assets to satisfy a wrongful death claim).
425 See, e.g., Sieh v. Sieh, 713 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2006) (holding that assets in a
deceased settlor's revocable trust were subject to his surviving spouse's elective share);
Lynch v. Lynch, 522 A.2d 234, 236 (Vt. 1987) (holding that "property in a trust created by a
spouse who retains a power of revocation is marital property subject to equitable distribu-
tion" in a divorce proceeding). The modern trend is to include revocable trust assets in
the decedent's estate for purposes of calculating a surviving spouse's elective share. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 cmts. i,j &
reporter's note (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. d & reporter's note
(2003); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 10-12 to -15 (4th ed. 2006). However, this is by no
means a universal rule. See, e.g., Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978, 983 (Ohio
1994) ("[A] valid [revocable] trust executed by a settlor and in existence at the time of his
or her death bars the settlor's spouse from claiming a distributive share in the trust as-
sets .... ."). A few states are now allowing surviving spouses to include revocable trust assets
in calculating their share under omitted spouse statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 21601, 21610 (West Supp. 2007) (providing the decedent's surviving spouse who was
unintentionally omitted from a will or revocable trust executed before marriage a share in
the decedent's estate and defining estate as "a decedent's probate estate and all property
held in any revocable trust that becomes irrevocable on the death of the decedent").
426 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Perry, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 446 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that assets of a decedent's revocable trust were subject to child support obligations);
L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 735 N.E.2d 359, 367 (Mass. 2000) (holding that assets of a decedent's
revocable trust could be reached to satisfy a support order for the benefit of his nonmarital
child). Some states also extend pretermitted child statutes to include a decedent's revoca-
ble trust as well as probate estate. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.3106 (West Supp. 2006)
(providing an intestate share to a child born to or adopted by the settlor after creation of a
revocable trust if the settlor unintentionally omitted that child from the trust).
427 Under the traditional view, a creditor could not reach revocable trust assets unless
a statute provided otherwise or the settlor made a fraudulent conveyance. 4 Sco-rr &
FRATrCHER, supra note 395, § 330.12, at 372-74. "More recently, the UTC, UPC, Restate-
ment 3d of Trusts, and several decisions have broken away from the traditional position
and allow the [settlor's] creditors to reach assets in a revocable trust, even though the
transfer to the trust was not in fraud of creditors." WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 425, at 8-4.
Today, the rights of creditors to reach assets of a living settlor's revocable trust are "a well
accepted conclusion." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt. (amended 2005). Although in some
states "the rights of a settlor's creditors in the assets of revocable trusts after the settlor's
death are uncertain," Clifton B. KruseJr. & Stanley C. Kent, Creditors'Rights in Probate Avoid-
ance Trusts-A Model Statute, PROB. & PRoP.,Jan./Feb. 1995, at 61, 64, this too is changing,
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out to be a "hollow privilege."4 2 8 Rules that protect trust privacy can
effectively make the settlor judgment proof. Those rules deny credi-
tors the basic information they need to pursue their claims-notice
that a trust exists. 4
29
In his best-seller, How to Avoid Probate!, Norman Dacey, the lead-
ing proponent of revocable trusts, warned readers that "[o]f course,
such a trust should not be used to deprive a spouse or creditors of
sums to which they might rightfully be entitled."430 Yet, this is pre-
cisely what trust privacy promotes. Under the cloak of privacy, "a
mean-spirited, no good curmudgeon" 4 31 can leave his widow penni-
less, and a deadbeat can "evad[e] . . . his just debts."43 2
see McGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 110, at 344 ("Creditors of a testator can reach the
probate estate to satisfy their claims. In some states creditors of the settlor of a revocable
trust have no comparable right, but this is no longer true in many jurisdictions today.").
For a review of the relevant case law, legislation, uniform law provisions, and literature, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmts. d, e & reporter's notes; WAGGONER ET AL.,
supra note 425, at 8-4 to -5.
428 Helen B. Jenkins, Creditors'Rights to Actual Notice of Revocable Trust on Death of Settlor
in the Aftermath of Pope: The Blessing of Change, the Sin of Avoidance, and the Forgiving Solution,
19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 453, 468 (1995).
429 See id. at 453 ("The lawyer remarked that the creditors were entitled to be made
whole out of the [revocable] trust estate, but added that no one really by law had the
responsibility for notifying the creditors of the decedent's untimely demise."); id. at
467-69, 474 (arguing that because "a revocable trust might well serve as a convenient vehi-
cle to avoid the payment of claims against a deceased settlor" creditors should be given
actual notice of the existence of such a trust if the settlor dies). A few states do provide
notice to revocable trust creditors. See id. at 470-73 (discussing California and Florida
legislation). Interestingly, California and Pennsylvania require notice to family survivors
who are not trust beneficiaries. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16061.7(b)(2) (requiring notice to
"[e] ach heir of the deceased settlor, if the event that requires notification is the death of a
settlor . . ."); Act of July 7, 2006, ch. 77, 2006 Pa. Legis. Serv. 305 (West) (requiring that
after the settlor of a revocable trust has died, the trustee send notice to "the settlor's spouse
or, if the settlor's spouse is incapacitated, the spouse's guardian [and] each of the settlor's
children who is sui juris and the guardian, if any, of each child who is not sui juris").
430 DACEY, supra note 55, at 45.
431 Friedberg v. SunBank/Miami, N.A., 648 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
see also Lynn Brenner, Spouse Gets Estate Share, NEWSDAY, Apr. 11, 2004, at E7 (stating that
because a revocable trust does not go through probate, "you can make it harder for [your
surviving spouse] to exercise the right of election by transferring all your assets to a revoca-
ble trust"). Revocable trusts may frustrate efforts to bring claims against an estate:
Anyone who has a potential legal claim on your estate must be notified in
advance of probate. Naturally, that includes your spouse .... But if you
transfer everything to a revocable trust, . . . there is no probate procedure.
When you die, your assets will pass to the trust beneficiaries without any
notice being given to anyone else. Your surviving spouse must then hire a
lawyer and start a proceeding to find out who has the assets. That's not
impossible, of course, but it is a higher hurdle to overcome.
Id.
432 Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 173 (Conn. 1942). Trust privacy's costs
to creditors are only likely to increase as the traditional notion that "[y]ou should keep
your promises and pay your debts because it is the right thing to do," Karen E. Boxx, Gray's
Ghost-A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1195, 1259 (2000), yields to
"[t]he [ascending] view that trusts are there to beat somebody out of something .... The
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CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom is that trust privacy should be pro-
tected and celebrated. To preserve privacy, courts and legislatures are
increasingly restricting access to trusts by beneficiaries, third parties
dealing with the trust or trustee, and the public at large.433 Even the
most reform-minded scholars, judges, legislators, and practitioners
have chosen to protect privacy at the expense of their larger reform
agenda. As a result, their ambitious efforts to unify the laws governing
wills and will substitutes434 and to codify a uniform national law of
trusts435 remain unfulfilled.
This Article has considered whether trust privacy in fact deserves
this privileged position. The Article concludes that trust privacy is by
no means the unmixed blessing its proponents claim.
To evaluate the merits and flaws of trust privacy, this Article has
presented a critical analysis of its human impact.436 This analysis has
revealed that trust privacy indeed has significant benefits for all af-
fected by trusts. It can promote settlors' control over their identity,
reputation, and property. 437 It can insulate trustees from beneficiary
complaints and interference. 43 18 Trust privacy can also protect benefi-
ciaries from the outside world, each other, and their own improvi-
dence. 439  In addition, trust privacy can provide emotional and
financial benefits for third parties who are not parties to decedents'
trusts.
4 4 0
At the same time, however, close analysis of trust privacy's human
impact has exposed a darker side that commentators have largely ig-
nored. It has shown that rules protecting privacy have real human
costs. Trust privacy can leave vulnerable settlors without property or
dignity.44' It can cause trustees unnecessary liability and conflict with
once unquestioned assumption that people want to pay their bills, and want their benefi-
ciaries to pay their bills, is seemingly under siege." Dobris, supra note 19, at 547 (footnote
omitted); see also Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors' Rights in Trusts, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 287, 364-66 (2002) (reviewing moral and economic arguments against asset
protection trusts and stating as one possible response "Eflor purposes of protecting volun-
tary creditors from ill-advisedly extending credit to persons whose assets are held in an
APT, the law might impose a public notice requirement for establishing an APT"). For a
response to Professor Danforth's proposal, see Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection
Trust, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 2685, 2689 n.20 (2006).
433 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
434 Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.
435 Id. at pt. Ill.
436 See supra Parts II, III.
437 See supra Part II.A.
438 See supra Part lI.B.
439 See supra Part II.C.
440 See supra Part II.D.
441 See supra Part III.A.
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beneficiaries. 442 Trust privacy can also leave beneficiaries at the
mercy of incompetent, partial, stingy, and larcenous trustees. 443 Fi-
nally, it can impede third parties and family members from receiving
the money they deserve.444
By presenting a more nuanced picture of trust privacy, this Arti-
cle hopes to encourage reformers to resist the understandable im-
pulse to protect trust parties from tabloid reporters, thieves, litigious
family members, and spendthrifts. Focusing on the costs as well as the
benefits of trust privacy can inspire a more consistent, principled, and
compassionate approach to trust reform. At the very least, it provides
a framework for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of future di-
rections for reform. The remainder of this Article will attempt to be-
gin that process by outlining four possible approaches to trust privacy
and their responses to the human costs identified above.
First, a full publicity approach would make revocable as well as testa-
mentary trusts public record. Limited precedent for this approach al-
ready exists. For example, some states have enacted statutes that
require recording of a trust in cases of real estate transactions to or
from the trust.445 The UPC has gone beyond the real estate context to
mandate registration with the appropriate local court of both testa-
mentary and revocable trusts. 446 Even the UPC, however, stops short
of a full publicity approach. To protect privacy, it provides that a trus-
tee must file only a brief synopsis of the trust.4 4 7 A full publicity ap-
proach would take that next step: It would apply in all contexts and
require recording of the entire trust instrument.
A full publicity approach would be the optimal scheme for ad-
dressing the human costs of trust privacy. It would provide benefi-
ciaries independent access to the entire trust instrument, thereby
giving a settlor's nearest and dearest the information they need to
protect the settlor from exploitation during her lifetime and to ensure
that after the settlor's death her property is distributed as she in-
tended.448 Giving independent access to the trust would reduce the
442 See supra Part III.B.
443 See supra Part III.C.
444 See supra Part III.D.
445 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
446 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 7-101, -102 & general cmt. (amended 2006).
447 Id. § 7-102 (requiring the trustee to file a brief "statement" disclosing only the
names of the settlor and original trustee, date of the trust, name and address of the regis-
tering trustee, and an "acknowledge[ment of] the trusteeship"). A number of state record-
ing statutes permit trustees involved in real estate transactions to file only a brief synopsis
of the trust rather than the trust instrument itself. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.14 (West
Supp. 2006) (requiring only an "affidavit"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501B.56, 508.62 (West
2002) (requiring only a "certificate of trust"); see also Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.B.1 (a)
(discussing restrictions on recording and registration of trusts to protect privacy).
448 See supra Part II1.A.
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risks to trustees that privacy creates-the climate of suspicion and con-
flict with beneficiaries, administrative costs, and potential liability.4 49
This approach would also help beneficiaries fulfill their legal responsi-
bilities as monitors and enforcers of trusts. 45°1 It would give third par-
ties the information they need to engage in commercial transactions
with trusts and trustees. 45 ' It would provide voluntary creditors infor-
mation to evaluate whether or not to extend credit in the first
place. 452 Finally, by permitting access to a revocable trust instrument,
this approach would remove a "hurdle"4 53 that impedes family and
third-party creditors from pursuing litigation to satisfy their claims.4 54
Given the strong pro-privacy sentiment today, however, a full publicity
approach is unlikely to be adopted despite its clear advantages.
Second, a wills approach would unify the treatment of wills and
revocable trusts. Like wills, 455 revocable trusts would remain private
during the settlor's lifetime but become public record after the set-
dor's death. In exceptional cases, such as a threat to a beneficiary's
life, a court could follow wills precedent 456 and temporarily seal a rev-
ocable trust instrument and any related documents and files.
For deceased settlors' revocable trusts, a wills approach would
have the identical effect on human costs as a full publicity approach.
Unlike a full publicity approach, however, a wills approach would be
theoretically consistent with some recent trust reforms by maintaining
privacy of living settlors' trusts. For example, the comment to section
7780.3 of the new Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act proclaims: "This
section recognizes that most revocable trusts are will substitutes and
preserves the privacy associated with wills until the settlor's death. '4 57
However, a wills approach would not address all human costs.
The basic problem is that although a revocable trust is principally a
"will substitute,"' 458 it differs from a will in a critical respect-a revoca-
449 See supra Part IlI.B.
450 See supra Part III.C.
451 See supra note 421 and accompanying text.
452 See Danforth, supra note 432, at 366.
453 See supra note 431.
454 See supra notes 422-32 and accompanying text.
455 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. II.A.1 (discussing treatment of wills); supra notes
28-54 (same).
456 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
457 Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act, § 7780.3 Pennsylvania cmt. (Proposed Draft
2005), available at http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/UTC%204%202005.pdf. Admittedly, even
Pennsylvania stops short of adopting a wills approach. To be consistent with notice re-
quirements for wills and intestacy, the Pennsylvania statute provides notice of the trust to a
settlor's spouse and children. See supra note 429 (summarizing Pennsylvania legislation).
The Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act, however, does not make the trust public record after
the settlor's death.
458 UNIF. TRUST CoDE § 112 cmt. (amended 2005) ("The revocable trust is used prima-
rily as a will substitute ....").
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ble trust may become operative during a settlor's lifetime. 459 Thus,
reformers would need to make some adjustments to a wills approach
to respond to concerns raised by living settlors' trusts. For example,
they should modify this approach to protect a vulnerable settlor from
trustee malfeasance. 460 At the very least, they should require that if a
settlor becomes incapacitated, someone other than the settlor and
trustee have access to the trust instrument. 461 One option 462 would be
to give trust beneficiaries that right.463 As UTC drafters have already
discovered, 464 however, beneficiary access to a living settlor's trust is
likely to encounter significant resistance. Opponents have success-
fully argued that "[b] ecause the devisees under a will have no right to
know of the devise no matter how incapacitated the settlor, then
neither should the beneficiaries of a revocable trust.' 4 65 Thus, a more
feasible if less comprehensive solution might be to modify a wills ap-
459 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing costs of revocable trusts that become operative
during a settlor's lifetime); see supra note 427 and accompanying text (discussing creditors'
rights to reach assets of living settlors' trusts).
460 See supra notes 208-25 and accompanying text (discussing trustee exploitation of
vulnerable settiors).
461 See David M. English, The New Mexico Uniform Trust Code, 34 N.M. L. REv. 1, 29, 30
n.351 (2004) (noting the problem with statutes that allow a settlor to waive beneficiary
rights to information about an incapacitated settlor's revocable trust). As Professor En-
glish explains, "The dilemma is that by directing that information be withheld, the settlor
may be denying the beneficiaries the very thing the beneficiaries need to make certain that
the trustee will carry out the settlor's dispositive wishes." Id.
462 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. e & reporter's notes (2007) (discuss-
ing various approaches to access information concerning the trust and the trust instrument
itself after a revocable trust settlor loses capacity).
463 See Foster, supra note 15, at pt. III.A. (summarizing various approaches UTC states
have adopted regarding beneficiary access to incapacitated settlors' revocable trusts).
464 Early UTC drafts made beneficiary rights to information about an incapacitated
settlor's revocable trust a mandatory rule that a settlor could not waive in the trust instru-
ment. See id. at 745 nn.207-09. After extensive debate and discussion, however, UTC
drafters adopted a "compromise," allowing "[s]ettlors for whom confidentiality is impor-
tant" to waive beneficiary rights to information regarding an incapacitated settlor's revoca-
ble trust. English, supra note 23, at 188; see also Foster, supra note 15, at 745-46 (discussing
changes in UTC drafts in response to privacy concerns regarding beneficiary access to
living settlors' revocable trusts).
465 English, supra note 23, at 188 (describing opponents' argument); see also UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (amended 2005) (stating that the 2004 amendment of the UTC
that gives states the option of providing beneficiaries no rights during a revocable trust
settlor's lifetime responded in part to "concern... that this section prescribe[dl a differ-
ent rule for revocable trusts than for wills and that the rules for both should instead be the
same. In the case of a will, the devisees have no right to know of the dispositions made in
their favor until the testator's death, whether or not the testator is incapacitated").
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proach 466 to give an incapacitated settlor's guardian, conservator, or
agent 46 7 access to the settlor's trust instrument.468
Third, an enforcement approach would preserve the privacy of both
living and deceased settlors' revocable trusts with limited exceptions
to ensure trust enforcement. Like the modified wills approach dis-
cussed immediately above, an enforcement approach would include
an exception to trust privacy during a settlor's lifetime. For example,
it would give someone other than the settlor and trustee access to the
revocable trust in the event of settlor incapacity. After the death of
the settlor, this third approach would depart from a wills approach. It
would keep the decedent's trust private from all but those who are
legally responsible for monitoring and enforcing the trust-trust ben-
eficiaries. 469 At a minimum, an enforcement approach would require
that current income beneficiaries and first-line remainder benefi-
ciaries470 receive notice of a deceased settlor's trust and a copy of the
trust instrument that defines beneficiary rights and trustee duties. Re-
formers could modify an enforcement approach to deny trust infor-
mation to "younger beneficiaries" 47' until those beneficiaries
"reach[ ] an age of maturity and self-sufficiency." 472 To ensure en-
forcement of the trust during that period, however, an enforcement
approach would require disclosure of trust information, including a
copy of the entire trust instrument, to someone with legal authority to
466 Generally, a will testator's conservator is not permitted access to an incapacitated
testator's will. See Estate of Du Nah v. Zetterberg, 165 Cal. Rptr. 170, 171 (Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that the testator's conservator "had no right to ... [possess the testator's will]
because the will was not property belonging to the conservatee's estate, and ... [her law-
yer] would be violating the confidence of his client Du Nah if he were to give up the will").
A few states, however, allow a conservator to view the will if the testator while competent
had deposited the will with a probate court for safekeeping. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-11-515 (2006) ("A conservator may be allowed to examine a deposited will of a pro-
tected testator under procedures designed to maintain the confidential character of the
document to the extent possible and to ensure that it will be resealed and kept on deposit
after the examination.").
467 This assumes that the settlor's guardian, conservator, or agent is not the same per-
son as the trustee.
468 See Act ofJune 14, 2006, ch. 217, 2006 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1748 (West) (stating that
"a person ... who represents a settlor lacking capacity may receive notice and give a bind-
ing consent on the settlor's behalf").
469 See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
470 Remainder beneficiaries as well as current income beneficiaries must have access to
trust information to ensure that a trustee fulfills the duty of impartiality to beneficiaries.
See supra text accompanying notes 344-45 (discussing the importance of notice to future as
well as current beneficiaries to ensure the trustee does not violate the duty of impartiality).
471 UNIF. TRUST Acr § 813 cmt. (Meeting Draft, 1999), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uta/trustam99.pdf.
472 Id. Reformers should adopt a reasonable "age of maturity," however. For example,
they should not follow the lead of the drafters of the draft West Virginia Uniform Trust
Code and allow the settlor to waive notice to beneficiaries whose age does not "exceed the
age of fifty." H.B. 2552, 77th Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 2005).
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monitor administration of the trust and to hold the trustee accounta-
ble for any violation of fiduciary duties. Recent variants of the UTC
suggest several possible candidates: a minor beneficiary's parent or
guardian,4 73 an adult beneficiary with a trust interest identical to that
of the beneficiary, 4 74 or a designated surrogate for the beneficiary. 475
An enforcement approach has one significant advantage: Several
states have already adopted it.476 The principal disadvantage of this
approach, however, is that it fails to address adequately the human
costs of trust privacy identified in this Article. In particular, by focus-
ing exclusively on enforcement of trusts, it provides minimal protec-
tion to settlors4 77 or family survivors and third parties who are not
trust beneficiaries. 4 78
Fourth, a full privacy approach would keep the trust private during
the settlor's lifetime and after the settlor's death. It would allow only
settlors, trustees, and tax authorities access to the trust instrument. It
would provide no notice whatsoever of the trust's existence even to
current beneficiaries. This Article's analysis demonstrates that a full
privacy approach is fundamentally flawed. This approach responds
only to the human benefits of trust privacy identified above. 4 79 It
completely ignores the human costs of trust privacy. Nevertheless, a
full privacy approach seems to be the current trend in trust law. As I
have shown elsewhere, state after state, especially those that have en-
473 See, e.g., Act of June 14, 2006, ch. 217, 2006 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1749 (West) ("A
parent may represent and bind the parent's unborn child or the parent's minor child if a
guardian of the property for the minor child has not been appointed."); id. ("A guardian
of the property may represent and bind the estate that the guardian of the property con-
trols."). The Florida statute defines representation to include rights to "notice, informa-
tion, accountings, or reports." Id. at 1748.
474 See, e.g., id. at 1749 ("Unless otherwise represented, a minor, incapacitated, or un-
born individual... may be represented by and bound by another person having a substan-
tially identical interest . . ").
475 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1301.05(c)(1), (3) (LexisNexis 2005) (allowing the
settlor to designate a surrogate "to receive any notice, information, or reports ... in lieu of
providing such notice, information, or reports to the beneficiaries"); H.B. 416, 126th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006) (allowing the settlor to designate in the trust instrument a
person other than the trustee to serve as a "'beneficiary surrogate' . . . to receive notices,
information, and reports otherwise required to be provided to a current beneficiary"). For
a critique of this approach, see Gallanis, supra note 23, at 1625-26.
476 For example, states that have enacted legislation identical or nearly identical to the
2000 version of the UTC fall within this category. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 46A-6-603(A)
(2005) ("While a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of
the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclu-
sively to, the settlor."); id. §§ 46A-1-105(B)(8), (9), -8-813 (requiring trustee to provide
notice and information after the settlor's death to beneficiaries who are twenty-five years or
older in age).
477 Even a modified enforcement approach would not address the lifetime or post-
mortem costs discussed above, see supra Part IILA, to settlors who are not legally
incapacitated.
478 See supra Part III.D.
479 See supra Part II.
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acted extreme pro-privacy variants of the UTC, have given the settlor
the right to waive all trustee duties to inform beneficiaries, including
notice of a deceased settlor's trust.4 80
If reformers continue on this path, the ultimate costs may be sys-
temic as well as human. A full privacy approach may spell the very
end of the trust. A trust so private that it lacks beneficiary enforce-
ment and trustee accountability is effectively no trust at all.
480 Foster, supra note 15, at pts. II.B.3(b), IV.A.4.
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